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Abstract
In this work, we address the question of how to enable a system to operate despite the
presence of misbehavior. Specifically, in a mobile ad-hoc network, how can we keep
the network functional for normal nodes when other nodes do not route and forward
correctly?
Node misbehavior due to selfish or malicious reasons or faulty nodes can significantly
degrade the performance of mobile ad-hoc networks. Existing approaches such as
economic incentives or secure routing by cryptographic means alleviate some of the
problems, but not all. For instance, nodes can still forward packets on bogus routes.
We propose a protocol called CONFIDANT (Cooperation Of Nodes — Fairness In
Dynamic Ad-hoc NeTworks) to cope with misbehavior. It enables nodes to detect
misbehavior by first-hand observation and use of second-hand information provided
by other nodes. The view a node has about the behavior of another node is captured in
a reputation system, which is used to classify nodes as misbehaving or normal. Once
a misbehaving node is detected, it is isolated from the network.
Reputation systems can, however, be tricked by the spread of false reputation ratings,
be it false accusations or false praise. Simple solutions such as exclusively relying
on one’s own direct observations have drawbacks, as they do not make use of all the
information available. To solve this problem, we propose a fully distributed reputation
system that can cope with false information and effectively use second-hand infor-
mation in a safe way. Our approach is based on a modified Bayesian estimation and
classification procedure. In our approach, each node maintains a reputation rating and
a trust rating about all other nodes it cares about. Reputation ratings capture the quality
of the behavior of a node as an actor in the network performing routing and forwarding
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tasks. From time to time first-hand reputation information is exchanged with others;
using a modified Bayesian approach we designed, second-hand reputation informa-
tion is only accepted if it is compatible with the current reputation rating. Reputation
ratings are only slightly modified by accepted information. Trust ratings capture the
quality of a node as an actor in the reputation system and reflect whether the reported
first hand information summaries published by node are likely to be true. Trust rat-
ings are updated based on the compatibility of second-hand reputation information
with prior reputation ratings. We enable node redemption and prevent the sudden ex-
ploitation of good reputation built over time by introducing reputation fading. Data is
entirely distributed, the reputation and trust value of a node is the collection of ratings
maintained by others.
We use simulation to evaluate and demonstrate the performance. We found that CON-
FIDANT can keep the network performance high even when up to half of the network
population misbehaves. We show that our approach of using second-hand information
significantly speeds up the detection of misbehaving nodes while keeping the number
of false positives and negatives negligibly low.
Zusammenfassung
In der vorliegenden Arbeit bescha¨ftigen wir uns mit der Frage, wie es einem System
ermo¨glicht werden kann, trotz Fehlverhalten einiger Elemente zu funktionieren. Im
Besonderen in mobilen ad-hoc Netzwerken: Wie ko¨nnen wir das Netzwerk fu¨r regula¨re
Knoten funktionstu¨chtig erhalten, wenn andere Knoten ungu¨ltige Pfade angeben oder
Pakete nicht korrekt weiterleiten. Fehlverhalten von Knoten, in eigennu¨tziger oder
bo¨swilliger Absicht oder aufgrund von Fehlerhaftigkeit, kann die Leistung von mo-
bilen ad-hoc Netzwerken erheblich beeintra¨chtigen. Bekannte Lo¨sungsansa¨tze wie
o¨konomische Anreizsysteme oder sicheres Routing durch kryptographische Verfahren
vermindern einige aber nicht alle Probleme. Beispielsweise ko¨nnen Knoten trotz
dieser Massnahmen Pakete auf ungu¨ltige Pfade weiterleiten.
Wir schlagen ein Protokoll namens CONFIDANT (Cooperation Of Nodes — Fairness
In Dynamic Ad-hoc NeTworks) vor, um Fehlverhalten zu verkraften. Das Protokoll er-
laubt es Knoten, Fehlverhalten durch Beobachtung erster Hand und Informationen aus
zweiter Hand, die von anderen Knoten zur Verfu¨gung gestellt werden, zu erkennen.
Die Ansicht eines Knotens u¨ber das Verhalten anderer Knoten wird in einem Rep-
utationssystem festgehalten, welches dazu benutzt wird, Knoten als fehlerhaft oder
normal zu klassifizieren. Sobald ein fehlerhafter Knoten entdeckt wird, wird er vom
Netzwerk ausgeschlossen.
Reputationssystem ko¨nnen jedoch u¨berlistet werden, indem unrichtige Informationen
in der Form von falschen Anschuldigungen oder falschem Lob verbreitet werden. Ein-
fache Lo¨sungsansa¨tze wie die Beschra¨nkung auf eigene direkte Beobachtung haben
den Nachteil, nicht alle zur Verfu¨gung stehenden Informationen zu beru¨cksichtigen.
Um dieses Problem zu lo¨sen schlagen wir ein ga¨nzlich verteiltes Reputationssystem
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vor, das mit falschen Informationen umgehen kann und Informationen aus zweiter
Hand effektiv und sicher nutzt. In unserem Lo¨sungsansatz speichert jeder Knoten
seine Bewertung in den Kategorien Reputation und Vertrauen von allen ihm wichti-
gen anderen Knoten. Reputationsbewertungen stellen die empfundene Qualita¨t eines
Knotens als Akteur im Netzwerk in seiner Funktion als Router und Relais dar. Knoten
tauschen ihre Reputationsbewertungen erster Hand von Zeit zu Zeit untereinander aus.
Mit dem von uns entworfenen Bayes’schen Ansatz werden Reputationsbewertungen
aus zweiter Hand nur beru¨cksichtigt, wenn sie mit der aktu¨llen Reputationsbewer-
tung kompatibel sind. Die vorhandene Reputationsbewertung wird nur geringfu¨gig
durch beru¨cksichtigte Information aus zweiter Hand vera¨ndert. Vertrauensbewertun-
gen stellen die empfundene Qualita¨t eines Knotens als Akteur im Reputationssys-
tem selbst dar und beinhalten die Bewertung, ob erhaltene Informationen plausibel
sind. Vertrauenssbewertungen werden basierend auf der Kompatibilita¨t der erhaltenen
mit den vorhandenen Reputationsbewertungen vera¨ndert. Wir ermo¨glichen die Reha-
bilitierung ausgeschlossener Knoten und verhindern die plo¨tzliche Ausnutzung einer
guten Reputation, die im Laufe der Zeit aufgebaut wurde, durch die Einfu¨hrung eines
zeitlichen Abklingens von Reputation und Vertrauen. Die Bewertungsdaten sind vo¨llig
verteilt, die Reputations- und Vertrauensbewertung eines Knotens setzt sich jeweils aus
den Bewertungen der anderen Knoten zusammen.
Um die Gu¨te unseres Protokolls zu evaluieren, setzen wir das Mittel der Simulation
ein. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass CONFIDANT die Netzwerkleistung auf hohem
Niveau erhalten kann, sogar wenn bis zur Ha¨lfte der Netzwerkknoten Fehlverhalten
aufweisen. Wir zeigen, dass unser Ansatz der Beru¨cksichtigung von Informationen
aus zweiter Hand Knoten mit Fehlverhalten erheblich schneller erkennt, wa¨hrend die
Anzahl der falschen Positive und Negative vernachla¨ssigbar gering gehalten wird.
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1
Introduction
“You can’t build a reputation on what you’re going
to do.”
Henry Ford
1.1 Motivation and Problem Statement
In mobile ad-hoc networks, nodes act as both routers and terminals. Take as an ex-
ample a mobile ad-hoc network set up at a conference to distribute files and discuss
talks without using any wireless infrastructure that would have to be paid. For the lack
of routing infrastructure, the nodes have to cooperate to communicate. Cooperation at
the network layer takes place at the level of routing, i.e. finding a path for a packet,
and forwarding, i.e. relaying packets for other nodes.
Misbehavior means aberration from normal routing and forwarding behavior. It arises
for several reasons. When a node is faulty, its erratic behavior can deviate from the
protocol and thus produce non intentional misbehavior. Intentional misbehavior aims
at providing an advantage for the misbehaving node. An example for an advantage
gained by misbehavior is power saved when a selfish node does not forward packets
for other nodes. An advantage for a malicious node arises when misbehavior enables
it to mount an attack.
Without appropriate countermeasures, the effects of misbehavior have been shown to
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dramatically decrease network performance. Depending on the proportion of mis-
behaving nodes and their specific strategies, network throughput can be severely de-
graded, packet loss increases, nodes can be denied service, and the network can be
partitioned. These detrimental effects of misbehavior can endanger the functioning of
the entire network.
The problem we want to solve is the following. How can we make an existing system
keep working despite the presence of misbehavior? As a specific application to the
case of a mobile ad-hoc network, how can we keep the network functional for normal
nodes when other nodes do not route and forward correctly?
1.2 State of the Art
The main solution approaches addressing the problem of misbehavior in mobile ad-
hoc networks are secure routing, economic incentives, and detection and reputation
systems. Economic incentives such as payment or counter schemes specifically ad-
dress forwarding of packets for other nodes. Secure routing aims at securing the es-
tablishment and maintenance of routes. We describe and discuss several approaches.
We propose a reputation system combined with detection, trust, and path management.
We show that it copes with a larger set of misbehavior types than both the economic
incentives and the secure routing approaches. In contrast to other reputation system
approaches for mobile ad-hoc networks, we offer a mechanism to make use of second-
hand information while coping with spurious ratings.
1.3 Solution Proposal: CONFIDANT
1.3.1 Overview
We developed a protocol called CONFIDANT (Cooperation Of Nodes – Fairness In
Dynamic Ad-hoc NeTworks) to cope with misbehavior. It helps an existing system
to cope with misbehavior. As a concrete instantiation of such an existing system, we
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chose mobile ad-hoc networks running Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) and applied
CONFIDANT to it.
The approach we use in CONFIDANT is to detect misbehaving nodes and to render
them harmless, regardless of the reason of their misbehavior, be it selfish, malicious,
or faulty. The response to detected misbehaving nodes is to isolate them, so that mis-
behavior will not pay off but result in denied service and thus cannot continue. CON-
FIDANT detects misbehaving nodes by means of direct observation or second-hand
information about several types of attacks, thus allowing nodes to route around misbe-
having nodes and to isolate them.
Nodes have a monitor for observations, reputation records for first-hand and trusted
second-hand observations about routing and forwarding behavior of other nodes, trust
records to control trust given to received second-hand information, and a path manager
to adapt their behavior according to reputation and to take action against misbehaving
nodes.
The dynamic behavior of CONFIDANT is as follows. Nodes monitor their neighbors
and change their reputation accordingly. From time to time they exchange the first-
hand information obtained by monitoring with other nodes, for potential consideration
in the reputation system. If they have reason to believe that a node misbehaves, i.e.
when the reputation rating is bad, they take action in terms of their own routing and
forwarding. They thus route around suspected misbehaving nodes. Depending on
the rating and the availability of paths to the destination, the routes containing the
misbehaving node are either re-ranked or deleted from the path cache. Future requests
by the badly rated node are ignored.
We use a Bayesian approach for several tasks, namely to represent and update the belief
of nodes about the behavior of other nodes both as actors in the network protocol and
as sources of second-hand information about other nodes, to make decisions about the
classification of nodes according to this belief, and to select and integrate second-hand
information. The Bayesian approach enables us to estimate the true probability of
misbehavior based on evidence of observed behavior.
CONFIDANT consists of several components for the tasks of monitoring the behavior
of other nodes, the dissemination of information about other nodes, the management
4 Introduction
of trust and reputation, and the response to misbehavior. We present these components
in the following section.
1.3.2 Monitoring and Detection: The Neighborhood Watch
In a wireless networking environment, the nodes most likely to detect misbehavior are
the nodes in the vicinity of the misbehaving node and in some cases the source and the
destination, if they detect unusual behavior or do not get proper responses.
Nodes can form a belief about the behavior of other nodes by keeping track of direct
observation and experience. By the use of the so-called passive acknowledgment they
can monitor their neighborhood. Passive acknowledgment means that instead of wait-
ing for an explicit acknowledgment for each packet by the next-hop node on the route,
a node assumes the correct reception of the packet when it overhears the next-hop node
forwarding the packet. Passive acknowledgment is possible in environments with bidi-
rectional links and is a standard alternative to explicit acknowledgment, where nodes
send an acknowledgment to the previous hop upon receipt of a packet.
We use the simple passive acknowledgment not only for an indication of correct recep-
tion at the next hop, but also to detect if nodes fail to forward packets. We enhanced
the passive acknowledgment mechanism to detect several kinds of misbehavior. We
added capabilities to compare packets to detect the illegitimate modification of header
fields and the fabrication of messages. With our modified passive acknowledgment
mechanism, nodes make inferences from all messages overheard and classify behavior
as normal or misbehaving at each observation. See [23], Sections 2.2 and 6, for details.
We call the information gained by direct experience by node   about node  first-
hand information (
 
) and use it as an input to the reputation system component of
CONFIDANT.
1.3.3 Reputation and Trust
Reputation systems are used for example in some online auctioning systems. They
provide a means of obtaining a quality rating of participants of transactions by having
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both the buyer and the seller give each other feedback on how their activities were
perceived and evaluated. There are two main ideas behind the use of reputation sys-
tems. First, it is used to serve as an incentive for good behavior to avoid the negative
consequences a bad reputation can entail. Second, it provides a basis for the choice of
prospective transaction partners.
The most relevant properties of a reputation system are the representation of reputation,
how the reputation is built and updated, and for the latter, how the ratings of others are
considered and integrated. The reputation of a given node is the collection of ratings
maintained by others about this node. In our approach the reputation system is fully
distributed, and a node   maintains ratings about every other node  that is cares about.
The reputation rating represents the opinion formed by node   about node ’s behavior
as an actor in the base system (for example, whether node  correctly participates in
the routing protocol). The trust rating represents node   ’s opinion about how honest
node  is as an actor in the reputation system (i.e. whether the reported first hand
information summaries published by node  are likely to be true).
We represent the ratings that node   has about node  as data structures 
 
for repu-
tation and 
 
for trust. In addition, node   maintains a summary record of first hand
information about node  in a data structure called 
 
.
To take advantage of disseminated reputation information, i.e., to learn from observa-
tions made by others before having to learn by own experience, we need a means of
incorporating the reputation ratings into the views of others. We do this as follows.
First, whenever node   makes a first hand observation of node ’s behavior, the first
hand information 
 
and the reputation rating 
 
are updated. Second, from time
to time, nodes publish their first-hand information. Say that node   receives from 
some first hand information 

about node . If  is classified as trustworthy by  ,
or if 

is close to 
 
(the ratings are compatible) then 

is accepted by   and is
used to slightly modify the rating 
 
. Else, the reputation rating is not updated. In
all cases, the trust rating 
 
is updated; if 

is close to 
 
, the trust rating 
 
slightly improves, else it slightly worsens. Note that, with our method, only first hand
information 
 
is published; the reputation and trust ratings 
 
and 
 
are never
disseminated.
The ratings are updated based on a Bayesian approach modified by an exponential de-
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cay of the posterior, such that more emphasis is given to recent ratings. This allows
for node redemption and at the same time prevents a node from misbehaving with-
out hindrance by capitalizing on a good reputation built in the past. See [22], Section
IV.A for the general Bayesian approach, and Section IV.B, for details of the modified
approach. We also modify a Bayesian model merging method to consider only com-
patible second-hand information and even then to only slightly influence the reputation
ratings kept by a node, see [22], Section IV.C, for our approach and [20], Appendix 2,
for a brief background on Bayesian model merging.
1.3.4 Response: The Path Manager
Once a node   classifies another node  as misbehaving,   isolates  from communica-
tions by not using  for routing and forwarding and by not allowing  to use  . This
isolation has three purposes. The first is to reduce the effect of misbehavior by depriv-
ing the misbehaving node of the opportunity to participate in the network. The second
purpose is to serve as an incentive to behave well in order not to be denied service.
Finally, the third purpose is to obtain better service by not using misbehaving nodes
on the path.
The path manager performs the following functions: Path re-ranking according to se-
curity metric (e.g. reputation of the nodes in the path), deletion of paths containing
misbehaving nodes, action on receiving a request for a route from a misbehaving node
(e.g. ignore, do not send any reply), and action on receiving request for a route con-
taining a misbehaving node in the source route (e.g. ignore, alert the source).
1.4 Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of CONFIDANT on two levels. First we investigate the
impact on the mobile ad-hoc network itself. Using simulation, we show several scenar-
ios of misbehavior and compare the network performance yielded by Dynamic Source
Routing (DSR) with CONFIDANT to the one obtained in a mobile ad-hoc network us-
ing regular DSR. The metrics used for the network performance are throughput, utility,
and overhead. See [19], Section 4.2, for definitions. We also compare the performance
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in the absence of misbehavior.
By means of a factorial design, we vary several factors such as network size, population
proportion of misbehaving nodes, mobility, and threshold values for detection and
reputation.
The second level of performance evaluation concerns the robustness of CONFIDANT
itself in terms of vulnerabilities, false positives and negatives, detection speed of mis-
behaving nodes, and stability. To this end we again present several scenarios with
varying attacker models on the reputation and trust management.
We investigate questions such as the following:
 How can we use second-hand information without rendering the reputation sys-
tem unreliable due to potentially spurious ratings?
 Are there attacks on the reputation system itself? How would they work and how
can we thwart them?
 What is the effect of mobility on the detection of misbehavior?
 With whom should nodes exchange information about other nodes?
 What kind of information should be kept and exchanged?
 Assuming a preventive scheme in place, is there still a need for a detection
scheme?
 How many misbehaving nodes can the network tolerate?
 Even with detectable attacks, are there possibilities for an adaptive attacker to
go undetected?
 Which types of misbehavior can we detect?
1.5 Test-Bed
We built a test-bed to evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of both attacks on the
network (misbehavior) and their detection in a real network environment.
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To this end, we combined and modified several components such as an implementation
of DSR in Linux, wireless network card drivers, test-bed utilities, and operating system
utilities. We added monitoring capabilities and our enhanced passive acknowledgment
to detect several types of misbehavior, which we also implemented. We also discuss
the limitations of detectability. See [23], Sections 4 and 7 for attacks.
We found that the implemented types of misbehavior have significant detrimental ef-
fects on the network when no countermeasures are taken. We also found that the moni-
toring and detection capabilities we added indeed enable a node to detect the dropping,
modification, and fabrication attacks we implemented.
1.6 Thesis Outline
In Chapter 2, we discuss the security vulnerabilities of routing and forwarding in mo-
bile ad-hoc networks and the effect of misbehavior. In Chapter 3, we give the state
of the art in coping with misbehavior in mobile ad-hoc networks, namely payment,
secure routing, and detection and reputation approaches. We present CONFIDANT in
Chapter 4, give a protocol walk-through in Chapter 5, and evaluate its performance in
Chapter 6. In Chapter 8 we present a test-bed for the evaluation of misbehavior and
detection. We discuss the application of CONFIDANT to other protocols in Chapter
9. Conclusions and further work follow in Chapter 10. In Appendix 7, we present a
variant of CONFIDANT that uses static trust.
1.7 Claims
The contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
 We found and analyzed several attacks on routing and forwarding in mobile ad-
hoc networks, focusing on the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol.
 We developed a system called CONFIDANT to combine monitoring and de-
tection of misbehavior, information dissemination and reputation management,
trust management, and response to thwart node misbehavior.
1.7 Claims 9
 We implemented both the protocol and misbehavior in GloMoSim.
 We extensively evaluated the protocol by simulation using factorial design and
found that it can cope well even with a large population of misbehaving nodes
that drop packets.
 We implemented and evaluated the effect of second-hand information for a rep-
utation system in mobile ad-hoc networks in R. We found that the use of second-
hand information significantly improves the detection speed of misbehavior but
at the risk of spurious ratings.
 We developed a robust reputation system using Bayesian estimation to make use
of second-hand information while coping with spurious ratings.
 We implemented both the reputation system and misbehavior with several strate-
gies for false accusations and praise in GloMoSim.
 We evaluated the performance of the reputation system applied to CONFIDANT.
 We built a test-bed for attacks and monitoring and demonstrate the feasibility
and detectability of several attacks.
 We investigated the application of CONFIDANT to other protocols.
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2 Background Information
“First learn the meaning of what you say, and then
speak.”
Epictetus
In this chapter we give a brief introduction to concepts and components we use through-
out the thesis. First, we review security requirements of mobile ad-hoc networks, fol-
lowed by a list of properties special to mobile ad-hoc networks. These properties in
turn influence the way the security requirements can be met. In this thesis we use the
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [63] as an example of a routing protocol for mobile
ad-hoc networks. We apply CONFIDANT to DSR to make it robust against node mis-
behavior, we therefore restrict our description of routing in mobile ad-hoc networks to
DSR which we describe in this chapter. We make use of Bayesian estimation and thus
give some background information at the end of this chapter.
2.1 A Brief Review of Network Security
This section shows security requirements, possible attacks in traditional networks [115]
and additional considerations for mobile ad hoc networks.
Authentication is needed in order to be sure about the identity of the sender or re-
ceiver of a message. The attack is called masquerading, that is pretending to be
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somebody else. Since in mobile ad hoc networks there are no central author-
ities available for certificates and key distribution to authenticate identities, it
becomes harder to detect corrupted nodes. A distributed kind of authentication
is needed. All other services depend on authentication.
Confidentiality concerns the content of a message. Only the sender and the receiver
are supposed to know the content. Attacks include message interception (man-
in-the-middle attacks), content release to other parties, etc. In mobile ad hoc
networks, wireless link broadcast facilitates eavesdropping and key distribution
is more difficult.
Integrity ensures that system assets and transmitted information are modified only
by authorized parties. Modification includes writing, changing, changing status,
deleting, creating, and the delaying or replaying of transmitted messages.
Availability of services or devices is attacked by denial of service. This is tradi-
tionally done by interruption, network or server overload. With mobile ad hoc
networks of potentially low powered devices, sleep deprivation (engaging the
devices CPU until the battery power is exhausted) or incorrect forwarding of
messages are effective attacks. Network overload is easier on small bandwidth
wireless links and bogus routing advertisements are harder to detect in a dynamic
environment.
Access Control restricts resources, services or data to special identities according
to their access rights or group memberships for instance. Access control enforces
authorization. Means to attack are again masquerading, message interception
and modification, forging,etc. Since with mobile ad hoc networks there is no
infrastructure and the network is potentially highly dynamic, it is hard to detect
corrupted nodes. In order to exercise access control, distributed authentication
management is needed.
Non-Repudiation is about not being able to deny having sent or received a message.
A typical attack is masquerading.
Threats endanger the security, they can be deliberate or accidental. Attacks are ma-
terialized threats. Safeguards aim at protecting against threats and can be physical
control, mechanism, policy, procedure to protect assets from threats. A policy governs
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whether a service is used. A vulnerability is the absence of a safeguard. Mechanisms
provide services. Attacks are interruption for availability, interception for confidential-
ity, modification for integrity, fabrication for authenticity. Attacks are passive (release
of contents, traffic analysis) or active (masquerade, replay, modification, denial of ser-
vice).
2.2 Mobile Ad Hoc Networks Special Properties
Mobile ad hoc networks exhibit properties different from fixed networks or infrastructure-
based wireless networks. These properties make it harder to implement security ser-
vices or even exhibit vulnerabilities to different and additional security attacks:
Unreliable wireless links are vulnerable to jamming and by their inherent broad-
cast nature facilitate eavesdropping.
Constraints in
bandwidth are caused by the limits of the air interface with fading and noise.
computing power in mobile devices require security mechanisms to be low
in computation overhead.
battery power in mobile devices can lead to application specific trade-offs
between security and longevity of the device.
Mobility/Dynamics make it hard to detect behavior anomalies such as advertising
bogus routes since routes in this environment change frequently. It is difficult to
employ mechanisms like firewalls, because the border between being inside or
outside the network is blurred.
Self-organization is a key property of ad hoc networks. They can not rely on cen-
tral authorities and infrastructures. Therefore, trust management has to be dis-
tributed and adaptive [13]. On the bright side, self-organization leads to inherent
better fault tolerance thanks to the absence of the potential bottleneck of central-
ized authorities.
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Latency is increased by the fact that in order to save battery power devices can decide
to sleep and only wake up, when there is a message for them, which increases
the reaction time of the device by the time it takes to wake up. Inherently the
round-trip-time for packets is increased in wireless multi-hop networks, render-
ing message exchange for security more expensive.
Multiple paths are likely to be available given sufficient node density. [45] This
property offers an advantage over infrastructure-based local area networks that
can be exploited by diversity coding. This means that multiple copies of a packet
or parts of it can be sent over different paths to increase the probability of a
packet actually arriving at a destination unchanged.
2.3 The DSR Protocol
Dynamic Source Routing is a protocol developed for routing in mobile ad-hoc net-
works and was proposed for MANET by Broch, Johnson and Maltz [63]. In a nut-
shell, it works as follows: Nodes send out a ROUTE REQUEST message, all nodes
that receive this message forward it to their neighbors and put themselves into the
source route unless they have received the same request before. If a receiving node
is the destination, or has a route to the destination, it does not forward the request,
but sends a REPLY message containing the full source route. It may send that reply
along the source router in reverse order or issue a ROUTE REQUEST including the
route to get back to the source, if the former is not possible due to asymmetric links.
ROUTE REPLY messages can be triggered by ROUTE REQUEST messages or gra-
tuitous. After receiving one or several routes, the source picks the best (by default the
shortest), stores it, and sends messages along that path. In general, the better the route
metrics (number of hops, delay, bandwidth or other criteria) and the sooner the REPLY
arrived at the source (indication of a short path - the nodes are required to wait a time
corresponding to the length of the route they can advertise before sending it in order to
avoid a storm of replies), the higher preference is given to the route and the longer it
will stay in the cache. In case of a link failure, the node that cannot forward the packet
to the next node sends an error message toward the source. Routes that contain a failed
link, can be ‘salvaged’ by taking an alternate partial route that does not contain the bad
link.
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2.4 Reputation Systems
Reputation systems are used in some online auctioning systems and provide means of
obtaining a quality rating of participants of transaction by having both the buyer and
the seller give each other feedback on how their activities were perceived and evalu-
ated. With these reputation systems, transaction partners can then be rated according
to the number of transactions already completed as well as the grades obtained from
their former buyers or sellers. There are different representations of the ratings sport-
ing either an average value of the rating, or all obtained ratings or the latest ratings
up to a specific time. The latter enables ’bad’ trading partners to have their rating
timed out and be improved by constant ’good’ behavior over the specified period of
time, i.e. they are not punished forever for having shown bad behavior in the past.
Such rating schemes enforce a preference of ’good’ trading partners over ’bad’ ones,
thus isolating the ’bad’ or unreliable ones from the business. In the networking world,
this would mean, that ’bad’ nodes would be isolated from communications within the
network. The auctioning analogy, however, can not be applied directly to a mobile
ad hoc network context, since the ratings are stored on one or more central auction
servers, an infrastructure that is not available in ad hoc networks. Therefore, in order
to apply such a rating scheme, it has to work in a distributed fashion, which raises
the usual centralized versus distributed approach questions like additional overhead,
consistency, redundancy handling, and so forth. Similar to the auctioning feedback are
some consumer or opinion sites, where comments on experiences with products and
evaluations are entered. In this version, no transaction has to be carried out an evalua-
tion and rating, which makes it easier to give early warnings but also renders them less
credible.
2.5 Bayesian Estimation
2.5.1 Belief Representation Using the Beta Function
Bayes’ Theorem is shown in Equation 2.1. It is used to calculate the probability of a
random variable given an observation.
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A prior distribution (prior to receiving information) reflects the initial belief. Any up-
front information can be fed into the prior to give it a head start. The prior, however,
can also be chosen such that it reflects ignorance or indifference toward the initial
situation. Given this prior, at each observation the information available is updated to
reflect the added knowledge and to increase the precision of a belief. If the likelihood
of a property is binomial, i.e., successes and failures occur independently, a good prior
density is the Beta function. The Beta function is the conjugate prior for binomial
likelihood and thus the posterior (after taking into account the received information)
density is also Beta [9, 40]. The Beta function is used to reflect the prior belief. It is
defined as follows.
    Beta   
  
  
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
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The posterior is given and updated at each observation in the following way. We
use 	 to represent the number of successes and 
 for the number of failures. Then,
Beta    Beta    with     	 and      
 .
The Beta function offers moments that are simple to calculate.
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2.5.2 Model Merging
In their tutorial on Bayesian model averaging, Hoeting et al. [53] give the following
methodology.
If  is the quantity of interest, such as an effect size, a future observable, or the utility
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of a course of action, then its posterior distribution given data  is:
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This is an average of the posterior distributions under each of the models considered,
weighted by their posterior model probability. 
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 
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are the models considered.
The posterior probability for model 

is given by
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is the integrated likelihood of model 

, 

is the vector of parameters of model


,  



 is the prior density of the parameters under model 

,  




is the likelihood, and  

 is the prior probability that 

is the true model. All
probabilities are implicitly conditional on , the set of all models considered.
In addition, Davison [38] lists the following, with  being the variable of interest, and
 the data.
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Here 
 
is the parameter for model 
 
, under which the prior is  
 

 
 and the prior
probability of 
 
is  
 
.
Berger [9] lists several methods for combining probabilistic evidence. To process dif-
ferent sources of information, he lists two ad-hoc systems.
Linear Opinion Pool. Assign a positive weight 
 
(where  	
  

 
 ) to each
information source 
 
(supposedly to reflect the confidence in that information
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source), and then use
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Independent Opinion Pool. When the information sources seem “independent”,
use, as the overall probability distributions for ,
   

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  

 
 

(2.11)
The alternative to the use of ad-hoc rules is, according to Berger, probabilistic mod-
eling, i.e., obtaining the joint distribution of all random observables and unknown pa-
rameters of interest or, at least, determining enough to calculate the conditional (pos-
terior) distribution of the desired  given the observables. This is sometimes called the
super Bayesian approach, to emphasize that it is a single decision maker (the super
Bayesian) who is trying to process all the information to arrive at a distribution of 
which is consistent with probabilistic reasoning.
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2.5.3 Decision Making
The goal is to minimize risk. Loss can be represented as squared-error loss or 0-1 loss
for classification, for instance, as depicted in equations 2.13 and 2.14.
       
 (2.13)
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Then, for all actions the loss is calculated and weighted by its likelihood. Finally,
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the action Æ  with the smallest risk  (expected loss ) is chosen from   Æ  
    Æ 	.
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Chapter
3
State of the Art
“The only thing that will redeem mankind is co-
operation.”
Bertrand Russell
3.1 Main Solution Approaches in Mobile Ad-hoc
Networks
The main solution approaches addressing the problem of misbehavior in mobile ad-
hoc networks are secure routing, economic incentives, and detection, reputation, and
response systems. Economic incentives such as payment or counter schemes specifi-
cally address forwarding of packets for other nodes. Secure routing aims at securing
the establishment and maintenance of routes.
Detection, reputation, and response systems schemes aim at reactively detecting mis-
behavior and proactively isolating misbehaved nodes to prevent further damage. They
are not restricted to any particular kind of misbehavior. The only requirement is that
the misbehavior be detectable, i.e. observable and classifiable as such with a high
probability.
In the following sections we describe the main features of some proposals within the
respective solution tracks, briefly describe how they work, what they protect, and what
the open problems are.
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3.1.1 Payment Systems
Several approaches to provide economic incentives for cooperation have been pro-
posed. They thus target the problem of selfish misbehavior. The main assumption is
that nodes are economically rational.
Buttya´n and Hubaux proposed incentives to cooperate by means of so-called nuglets
[25] that serve as a per-hop payment in every packet in a secure module in each node
to encourage forwarding. The secure module is required to ensure the correct number
of nuglets is withdrawn or deposited. They propose two models for the payment of
packet forwarding, the Packet Purse Model and the Packet Trade Model. In the Packet
Purse Model the sender pays and thus loads the packet with a number of nuglets. Each
intermediate node takes one nuglet when it forwards the packet. If there are no nuglets
left at an intermediate node, the packet is dropped. If there are nuglets left in the
packet once it reaches the destination, the nuglets are lost. In the Packet Trade Model,
the destination pays for the packet. Each intermediate node buys a packet from the
previous hop and sells it to the next for more nuglets. Since charging the destination
and not the sender can lead to an overload of the network and the destination receiving
packets it does not want, mainly the Packet Purse Model is considered. This model,
however, can lead to the loss of nuglets which have to be re-introduced into the network
by a central authority.
To address this problem, the authors introduced another approach based on credit
counters [26], also implemented in tamper-proof hardware. In this approach, each
node keeps track of its remaining battery power and credit. One of their findings of a
simulation study of four different rules is that increased cooperation is beneficial not
only for the entire network but also for individual nodes.
Zhong, Chen, and Yang proposed Sprite [132]. As opposed to nuglets or counters
they do not require tamper-proof hardware to prevent the fabrication of payment units,
but their payment scheme requires a central credit clearance service (CCS) to be avail-
able eventually. Nodes keep a receipt of a message when they receive it. The receipt
contains a hash of the message itself so it can be verified which message the receipt be-
longs to. To claim their payment nodes have to send this receipt to the CCS. The CCS
charges the sender based on the number of receipts, the number of intermediate nodes
left to reach the destination, if any, and whether the destination has sent a receipt. The
3.1 Main Solution Approaches in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks 23
specific calculation of the fee is designed to make misbehavior in Sprite itself eco-
nomically undesirable, even in the case of collusion. The sender then pays the nodes
that sent a receipt to the CCS. For the nodes that were on the route but did not send a
receipt, the sender has to pay a small fee to the CCS. In addition to the availability of a
central authority, Sprite assumes source routing, and a public key infrastructure. They
do not explain how the payment from the sender to nodes is done, whether nodes have
accounts with the CCS which transfers the payment or whether nodes remunerate one
another directly. In the latter case the money has to be unforgeable and payment has
to be ensured.
Raghavan and Snoeren propose priority forwarding [106] as incentives against self-
ish misbehavior. In their approach, potential dangers for ad-hoc networks are distin-
guished as misbehaving and greedy, where misbehavior constitutes a deviation from
the protocol and should be taken care of by secure routing mechanisms. For greedy
behavior, which is located at a higher layer in this approach, incentives to get priority
forwarding are proposed to be given by payment.
Crowcroft et al.[36] model economic incentives for users to forward for others in mo-
bile ad-hoc networks by being rewarded with their own ability to send traffic. An
advantage of their approach is that no currency is lost or gained, but a constant value
is approximated even when nodes leave or join the system.
3.1.2 Secure Routing with Cryptography
Secure routing proposals have been proposed mainly as modifications to existing rout-
ing protocols such as DSR [63] and AODV [97]. They aim at securing the routing
messages by cryptographic means to prevent misbehavior by malicious nodes.
SRP, the Secure Routing Protocol by Papadimitratos and Haas [103], guarantees cor-
rect route discovery, so that fabricated, compromised, or replayed route replies are
rejected or never reach the route requester. SRP assumes a security association be-
tween end-points of a path only, so intermediate nodes do not have to be trusted for
the route discovery. This is achieved by requiring that the request along with a unique
random query identifier reach the destination, where a route reply is constructed and
a message authentication code is computed over the path and returned to the source.
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The correctness of the protocol is proved analytically.
ARIADNE, a secure on-demand routing protocol by Hu, Perrig, and Johnson [56],
prevents attackers from tampering with uncompromised routes consisting of uncom-
promised nodes in the route discovery phase. It is based on Dynamic Source Routing
(DSR) and relies on symmetric cryptography only. It uses a key management proto-
col called TESLA that relies on synchronized clocks. Simulations have shown that
the performance is close to DSR without optimizations. While Ariadne assumes secu-
rity associations between all nodes, BISS by Capkun and Hubaux [30] reduces this to
require only the destination to have security associations with all nodes on the route.
SEAD, Secure Efficient Distance vector routing for mobile ad-hoc networks by Hu,
Johnson and Perrig [55] is based on the design of destination-sequenced distance-
vector routing (DSDV) and uses one-way hash functions to prevent uncoordinated
attackers from creating incorrect routing state in another node. Performance evaluation
has shown that SEAD outperforms DSDV-SQ in terms of packet delivery ratio, but
SEAD adds overhead and latency to the network.
The Security-aware Ad-hoc Routing (SAR) protocol by Yi, Naldburg, and Kravets
[124] modifies AODV to include security metrics for path computation and selection.
They define trust levels according to organizational hierarchies with a shared key for
each level, so that nodes can state their security requirements when requesting a route
and only nodes that meet these requirements (trust level, metrics), participate in the
routing. Questions not addressed by this protocol yet include the mechanism for key
distribution, knowledge of the keys of the other nodes, what happens when a node
leaves the group with the shared trust level and how trust hierarchies are defined in the
first place, especially in civilian applications. SAR relies on tamper-proof hardware.
Distance vector routing security has been examined by Smith, Murthy and Garcia-
Luna-Aceves [112] in general. They developed countermeasures for vulnerabilities
by protecting both routing messages and routing updates. They propose sequence
numbers and digital signatures for both routing messages and updates and including
predecessor information in routing updates.
Authentication by ‘imprinting’. Stajano and Anderson [114] authenticate users by
‘imprinting’ in analogy to ducklings acknowledging the first moving subject they see
3.1 Main Solution Approaches in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks 25
as their mother, but enable the devices to be imprinted several times. Imprinting is
realized by accepting a symmetric encryption key from the first device that sends such
a key. They neither address routing nor forwarding, however, user authentication and
authorization are an important prerequisite for trust in the network layer also in mobile
ad-hoc networks. Montenegro and Castelluccia [89] developed cryptographically
generated address-key pairs to prevent impersonation.
Asynchronous threshold security has been employed by Zhou and Haas [133] to-
gether with share refreshing for distributed certification authorities for key manage-
ment in mobile ad-hoc networks. They take advantage of inherent redundancies in
such networks due to multiple routes to enable diversity coding, allowing for Byzan-
tine failures given by several corrupted nodes or collusions. This approach potentially
is a strong prevention mechanism, however, to the best of our knowledge, the impact
on the network and the security performance remain to be investigated.
Self-organized PGP by using chains of certificates has been developed by Hubaux,
Buttya´n and Capkun [58]. Several certificate paths can be found by sharing informa-
tion of nodes that each keep a small part of the certification knowledge, a prerequisite
being the assumption that trust is transitive.
Localized certification based on the public key infrastructure (PKI) with certification-
authority and secret-share update functionalities distributed among neighbors have
been suggested by Kong, Zerfos, Luo, Lu and Zhang [72]. For threshold secret-sharing
and certification nodes need K one-hop neighbors within a given time window. The
nodes locally store the system certification revocation list. A simulation showed a good
success ratio and tolerable delay.
Digital signatures have also been suggested for the OSPF routing protocol by Mur-
phy and Badger [91]. It remains to be investigated in which cases and how digital
signatures can be employed in mobile ad-hoc networks. Lamparter, Riedel, and West-
hoff [76] investigated the use of digital signatures applied to payment systems such as
Sprite [132] and Secured Charging Protocol (SCP) [73] in mobile ad-hoc networks.
They found that the employment of digital signatures is feasible and suitable depend-
ing on the used algorithm, the length of the signature, and the size of the network and
its churn rate.
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3.1.3 Detection, Reputation, and Response Systems
A method for thwarting attacks is prevention. According to Schneier [110], a prevention-
only strategy only works if the prevention mechanisms are perfect; otherwise, some-
one will find out how to get around them. Most of the attacks and vulnerabilities have
been the result of bypassing prevention mechanisms. Given this reality, detection and
response are essential.
As opposed to the Byzantine Generals problem, the nodes in a misbehavior detection
and reputation system for mobile ad-hoc networks do not have to reach a consensus on
which nodes misbehave. Each node can keep its own rating of the network denoted by
the reputation system entries and it can choose to consider the ratings of other nodes or
to rely solely on its own observations. One node can have varying reputation records
with other nodes across the network, and the subjective view of each node determines
its actions. Byzantine robustness [98] in the sense of being able to tolerate a number
of erratically behaving servers or in this case nodes is the goal of a reputation system
in mobile ad-hoc networks. Here, the detection of malicious nodes by means of the
reputation systems has to be followed by a response in order to render these nodes
harmless.
Since mobile ad-hoc networks have properties that differ from wired networks, such as
the lack of infrastructure, misbehavior detection has to be adapted. Every node is their
own authority. Nodes can cooperate to compare their notes, but contrary to a wired
organized network, one cannot assume that the nodes are under the control of the same
organization.
Reputation systems are used to keep track of the quality of behavior of others. In
mobile ad-hoc networks, we are interested in the routing and forwarding behavior of
nodes. In order to keep track of behavior and to classify it according to whether it
is normal or misbehavior for instance, nodes have to be able to observe other nodes.
The main goal of reputation systems in mobile ad-hoc networks is to differentiate
between normal and misbehaved nodes in order to react accordingly, e.g. by isolating
misbehaved nodes from the network.
Only good behavior should pay off in terms of service and reasonable power consump-
tion. Detection of misbehavior has to trigger a response, i.e., a reaction of other nodes
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that results in a disadvantage for the misbehaved node.
The terms reputation and trust are being used for various concepts in the literature,
also synonymously. We define the term reputation here to mean the performance of
a principal in participating in the base protocol as seen by others. For mobile ad-
hoc networking this means participation in the routing protocol and forwarding.By the
term trust we denote the performance of a principal in the policing protocol that aims
at protecting the base protocol. For reputation systems this means the reliability as a
witness to provide honest reports, in a game-theoretic sense it entails the willingness
for retribution, in payment systems the participation in the payment itself.
Detection,reputation, and response provide a disincentive for cheating by excluding
nodes from the network. This isolation also protects the normal nodes. Misbehaved
nodes are shunned in two ways. First, nodes route around suspected misbehaved nodes
and thus select more reliable routes which increases their throughput. Second, nodes
do not provide service to suspected misbehaved nodes, hence their misbehavior ceases
to have an impact. The first prevents the misbehaved nodes from being used, the
second prevents them from using other nodes.
Reputation systems are not restricted to any one type of misbehaved node, such as
selfish, malicious, or faulty.
We now briefly describe some of the protocols proposed in the literature.
Watchdog and path rater components to mitigate routing misbehavior have been
proposed by Marti, Giuli, Lai and Baker [82]. They observed increased throughput
in mobile ad-hoc networks by complementing DSR with a watchdog for detection of
denied packet forwarding and a path rater for trust management and routing policy
rating every path used, which enable nodes to avoid malicious nodes in their routes as
a reaction. Ratings are kept about every node in the network and the rating of actively
used nodes is updated periodically. Their approach does not punish malicious nodes
that do not cooperate, but rather relieves them of the burden of forwarding for others,
whereas their messages are forwarded without complaint. This way, the malicious
nodes are rewarded and reinforced in their behavior.
CORE, a collaborative reputation mechanism proposed by Michiardi and Molva [83],
also has a watchdog component; however it is complemented by a reputation mech-
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anism that differentiates between subjective reputation (observations), indirect repu-
tation (positive reports by others), and functional reputation (task-specific behavior),
which are weighted for a combined reputation value that is used to make decisions
about cooperation or gradual isolation of a node. Reputation values are obtained by
regarding nodes as requesters and providers, and comparing the expected result to the
actually obtained result of a request. Nodes only exchange positive reputation infor-
mation.
A context-aware inference mechanism has been proposed by Paul and Westhoff [95],
where accusations are related to the context of a unique route discovery process and
a stipulated time period. A combination is used that consists of un-keyed hash veri-
fication of routing messages and the detection of misbehavior by comparing a cached
routing packet to overheard packets. The decision of how to treat nodes in the future is
based on accusations of others, whereby a number of accusations pointing to a single
attack, the approximate knowledge of the topology, and context-aware inference are
claimed to enable a node to rate an accused node without doubt. An accusation has
to come from several nodes, otherwise a single node making the accusation is itself
accused of misbehavior.
A reputation-based trust management has been introduced by Aberer and Despo-
tovic in the context of peer-to-peer systems [1], using the data provided by a decentral-
ized storage method (P-Grid) as a basis for a data-mining analysis to assess the prob-
ability that an agent will cheat in the future given the information of past transactions.
The disseminated information is exclusively negative, in the form of complaints that
are then redundantly stored at different agents. When agents want to assess the trust-
worthiness of other agents, they query several agents for complaints about the agent
in question. To assess the trustworthiness of the agents responding to the query and
thus to avoid relying on lies, a complaint query about that agent can be made. To avoid
the exploration of the whole network, the trustworthiness of the responders is said to
be given when a sufficient number of replicas returns the same result. An assumption
is that the underlying communication network is sound in that the complaints do not
have to be routed through malicious nodes, so the approach is not readily applicable to
mobile ad-hoc networks.
The EigenTrust mechanism by Kamvar, Schlosser and Garcia-Molina [66] aggregates
trust information from peer by having them perform a distributed trust calculation
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approaching the Eigenvalue of the trust matrix over the peers. The algorithm relies
on the presence of pre-trusted peers, that is some peers have to be trusted, regardless
their performance, prior to having interacted with them. The system relieves peer with
bad performance from delivering files, due to their bad reputation. By isolating peers
with bad reputation, the number of inauthentic downloads is decreased, however, if
the motivation for misbehavior is selfishness, the misbehaved peers are rewarded. The
authors propose to incent participation by offering better quality of service to peers
with a high reputation but do not offer any proposal of achieving this. To avoid all
the load going to the peers with the highest reputation and to allow new peers to build
up reputation, there is a 10% probability in EigenTrust to choose a peer with zero
reputation. If the download is not successful, the peer is removed from the list of
potential downloads. A potential drawback of this is that it provides an incentive to
change one’s identity after having misbehaved.
A formal model for trust in dynamic networks based on intervals and a policy lan-
guage has been proposed by Carbone, Nielsen, and Sassone [31]. They express both
trust and the uncertainty of it as trust ordering and information ordering, respectively.
They consider the delegation of trust to other principals. In their model, only positive
information influences trust, such that the information ordering and the trust ordering
can differ. In our system, both positive and negative information influence the trust
and the certainty, since we prefer  positive observations that come out of  total ob-
servations to  out of  when    . Evaluation of the trust model and the design of
an operational model are stated for future work.
Collaboration enforcement for peer-to-peer networks have been proposed by More-
ton and Twigg [90]. They allow for selective trust transitivity and distinguish between
trust as participator and trust as recommender. They define three operators, namely
discounting, consensus, and difference, to compute trust values. Since they use rec-
ommenders, trust in participators, trust in recommenders, and meta-recommenders,
the trust becomes recursive and they thus look for fixed-point solutions to the resulting
trust equations. The performance has not been evaluated.
OCEAN [8] by Bansal and Baker relies exclusively on first-hand observations. Di-
rectly observed positive behavior increases the rating, directly observed negative be-
havior decreases it by an amount larger than that used for positive increments. If the
rating is below the faulty threshold, the node is added to the faulty list. This faulty list
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is appended to the route request by each node broadcasting it to be used as an avoid list.
A route is rated good or bad depending on whether the next hop is on the faulty list. As
a response to misbehavior, nodes reject all traffic coming from a suspected mislead-
ing node, even if it is not the source of the traffic. The second chance mechanism for
redemption employs a timeout after an idle period. Then a node is removed from the
faulty list, its rating remaining unchanged. In addition to the rating, nodes keep track
of the forwarding balance with their neighbors by maintaining a chip count for each
node, which increases when requesting a node to forward a packet and decreases with
an incoming request from that node.
Intrusion detection for wireless ad-hoc networks has been proposed by Zhang and
Lee [130] to complement intrusion-prevention techniques. The authors argue that an
architecture for intrusion detection should be distributed and cooperative, using sta-
tistical anomaly-detection approaches and integrating intrusion-detection information
from several networking layers. They use a majority voting mechanism to classify be-
havior by consensus. Responses include re-authentication or isolation of compromised
nodes. Detection rates and performance penalties remain to be investigated.
Cross-feature analysis is proposed by Huang, Fan, Lee, and Yu [57] to detect routing
anomalies in mobile ad-hoc networks. They explore correlations between features
and transform the anomaly detection problem into a set of classification sub-problems.
The classifiers are then combined to provide an anomaly detector. A sensor facility is
required on each node to provide statistics information.
3.1.4 Discussion
Payment systems serve as an incentive to provide a well-defined service, such as packet
forwarding, to others for remuneration. The payment has to be unforgeable. To ensure
this, tamper-proof hardware and trusted third parties have been suggested. With pay-
ment systems, the issue of pricing and other economic questions, such as how to deal
with lost payment, arise. They can prevent selfish forwarding misbehavior, however,
they do not address malicious or faulty misbehavior.
Secure protocols prevent preconceived deviations from specific protocol functions.
They do, however, not aim at serving as incentives for cooperation or dealing with
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novel types of misbehavior that occur by going around the protected functions.
Reputation systems apply to a broader range of desired behavior as long as it is observ-
able and classifiable. They can, if they use second-hand information and have means to
cope with false accusations or false praise, partially prevent misbehavior by excluding
misbehaved nodes. This way, nodes can protect themselves before encountering the
misbehaved node. If the reputation systems rely exclusively on first-hand experience
to build reputation ratings, they can only prevent more of the misbehavior experienced
by a node after it occurred.
Preventive schemes can only protect what they set out to protect from the start. There
can, however, be unanticipated attacks that circumvent the prevention. It is vital that
this misbehavior be detected and prevented from happening again in the future. Self-
policing schemes are only as limited as their intrusion detection component regarding
detected attacks. The schemes themselves are flexible and can accommodate an evolv-
ing intrusion detection component. If the detection of a new attack is conceived of,
the detection component can be changed to reflect this added knowledge. This does
not in any way change the protocol. If a preventive scheme needs to be extended to
accommodate the advent of a new attack, a new version of the routing protocol is
required.
As opposed to payment systems, reputation systems do not assume that nodes have
to forward for others at least as many packets as they generate themselves. A self-
policing system in the sense of an intrusion detection component with a reputation
system merely penalizes a node if it does not do what it is supposed to do according
to its own promises. This difference offers an advantage in situations where a node is
simply not in the position to cooperate, e.g. when it is at the edge of the network and
does not get many requests. In any of the payment systems described here, the node
would run out of means to afford having its own packets forwarded by others. This
problem is prevented in a self-policing system.
Economic systems assume a rational node that aims at maximizing its utility expressed
in power or payment units. The node misbehavior targeted by payment systems is thus
selfish concerning utility but it is not malicious.
A malicious node is not necessarily aiming at a economizing on its resources. Its
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interest lies in mounting attacks on others. Secure routing protocols aim at preventing
malicious nodes from mounting attacks.
Although some reactive systems focus on selfish (Watchdog) or malicious misbehavior
(intrusion detection), this is not an intrinsic limitation. Self-policing networks can cope
with both selfish and malicious, and, in addition, with non intentional faulty misbehav-
ior, the only requirement being that such misbehavior be detectable, i.e. observable and
classifiable.
We deem the consideration of non intentional misbehavior such as bugs of high im-
portance, and we think it is vital to protect the network against misbehaved nodes
regardless the nature of their intentions. Non intentional misbehavior can result from
a node being unable to perform correctly due to a lack of resources, due to its particu-
lar location in the network, or simply because of the node being faulty. Self-policing
misbehavior detection, reputation, and response systems can be applied irrespective of
the actual cause of the misbehavior, be it intentional or not. When a node is classified
as misbehaved it simply means that the node performs badly at routing or forwarding.
No moral judgment is implied.
The question of a tamper-proof security module remains controversial [102], but might
prove inevitable. As opposed to nuglets and counters, the self-policing reputation
systems do not need tamper-proof hardware for themselves, since a malicious node
neither knows the entries of its reputation in other nodes nor does it have access to all
other nodes for potential modification. The secure module might still be necessary for
complementary protection such as authentication.
In a theoretical analysis of how much cooperation mechanisms can help by increas-
ing the probability of a successful forward, Lamparter, Plaggemeier, and Westhoff
[74] find that increased cooperation super-proportionally increases the performance
for small networks (i.e. fairly short routes). Cooperation increases more if the initial
probability  (the probability to cooperate by forwarding) is fairly acceptable (above
0.6). Even small increases in  as given by Æ , the change of the probability to cooper-
ate in the presence of an incentive mechanism such as a reputation system, can have a
dramatic improvement. They find, however, that the benefit is much more pronounced
in small networks with fairly short routes than in medium to large scale networks [75].
Chapter
4 Protocol Description
“If a thing’s worth having, it’s worth cheating for.”
W.C. Fields
“You’re always thinking you’re gonna be the one
that makes ’em act different.”
Woody Allen, ”Manhattan”
In this chapter we describe the CONFIDANT protocol. First we give the rationale and
explain how it finds its root in an ecological analogy. Then we describe the components
of CONFIDANT, assumed to be present in every node that runs it.
4.1 Ecological Analogy: When Nodes Bear
Grudges
As explained by Richard Dawkins in ‘The Selfish Gene’ [39], reciprocal altruism is
beneficial for every ecological system when favors are granted simultaneously, so there
is an intrinsic motivation for cooperation because of instant gratification. The benefit
of behaving well is not so obvious in the case where there is a delay between granting
a favor and the repayment. This is the case when, in mobile ad-hoc networks, nodes
forward on behalf of each other. An ecological example used by Dawkins [39] explains
the survival chances (and thus gene selection) of birds grooming parasites off each
other’s head, which they cannot clean themselves.
Dawkins divides birds into two types: ‘suckers’ that always help and ‘cheats’ that have
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other birds groom parasites off their head but fail to return the favor. In this system,
clearly the cheats have an advantage over the suckers, but both are driven to extinction
over time. Dawkins then introduces a third kind of bird, the ‘grudger’ that starts out
being helpful to every bird, but bears a grudge against those birds that do not return
the favor and subsequently no longer grooms their heads.
According to Dawkins, simulation has shown that when starting with a majority pop-
ulation of cheats and marginal groups of both suckers and grudgers, the grudgers win
over time. Winning is defined as having the greatest benefit, assuming a cost for
grooming another bird’s head and a profit for having one’s head groomed, with a loss
leading to extinction and profit leading to multiplication of the species. The rationale
is as follows: the suckers do favors more than they get because of the large number of
cheats, so the number of suckers decreases, whereas the number of cheats increases.
The grudgers also suffer from some loss, but less than the suckers. Once the suckers
are extinct, the grudgers grow rapidly at the expense of the cheats, because they do not
help a cheat twice and cheats are also not helped by other cheats. After a while, the
number of cheats decreases more slowly, because the probability of a first-help by a
grudger increases with a higher population of grudgers. Over all, the population of the
grudgers grows, whereas the other species become extinct.
Defining suitable cost and profit to routing and forwarding favors and keeping a history
of experiences with non cooperating nodes achieve the same as the grudger species,
i.e., driving the cheats out of business. In a very large ad-hoc network, convergence
can be very slow, and keeping a history of all bad experiences with other nodes equals
large storage requirements and long lists to go through. Therefore, we propose the
following ideas, which are incorporated in the CONFIDANT protocol explained in the
next sections in addition to the simple grudger reciprocity, to speed up the triumph of
grudger nodes:
o learn from observed behavior: employ ‘neighborhood watch’ to be warned by
observing what happens to other nodes in the neighborhood, before having to
make a bad experience oneself,
o learn from reported behavior: share information of experienced misbehavior
with others and learn from them.
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By employing a reputation system, we are exploiting the “shadow of the future” as
coined by Axelrod [5], which he identified as an incentive to cooperate in repeated
game-theoretic dilemmas. Although the insights on iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD)
cannot be directly transfered to routing and forwarding in mobile ad-hoc networks,
we will see in the next sections that CONFIDANT has the properties of successful
strategies in IPD: it is nice (starts out cooperating), it is reactive, and the strategy is
simple (i.e. known by the others).
4.2 Protocol Overview
4.2.1 Main Features of CONFIDANT
Our approach is the following. Nodes monitor their neighborhood and detect several
kinds of misbehavior by means of an enhanced passive acknowledgment mechanism
we designed. This means that every time a node sends a packet, it listens to overhear
whether the next-hop node on the route forwards the packet correctly. Consider the
following scenario as depicted in Figure 4.1. Node A sends packets via nodes B and C
to the destination D. For every packet, nodes keep track of the behavior of the next-hop
node and remember whether it has forwarded the packet correctly. A stores ratings
about B, B about C, etc., which we call first-hand information, since the ratings are
derived from direct observation.
Suppose that C misbehaves by dropping the packet instead of forwarding it, as shown
in Figure 4.1(a). B’s rating of C then becomes bad. Since A is not in range with C,
it cannot directly observe its behavior and thus cannot find out about C’s misbehavior.
We solve this problem by allowing the use of second-hand information as follows.
In addition to keeping track of direct observation, nodes publish, as shown in Fig-
ure 4.1(b), their first-hand information from time to time by local broadcasts to ex-
change information with other nodes. We call the published information of other nodes
second-hand information.
A thus receives information from its neighbors, here E, F, G, and B, about other nodes,
including C. Again, since A has no first-hand information about C in our scenario,
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(a) B misbehaves. (b) Nodes publish first-hand information.
(c) A rates C. (d) A isolates C.
Figure 4.1: Misbehavior Scenario. Node A’s View of the Network.
it can only find out about C’s misbehavior by second-hand information. There is,
however, a problem since second-hand information can be spurious. A node could for
instance make false accusations about another node.
We propose a combination of two mechanisms to cope with spurious second-hand
information. First, we only consider second-hand information that is not incompatible,
i.e. that does not deviate too much from the reputation rating. Our rationale behind this
is, that when second-hand information deviates substantially from the rating a node
has built over time using previously received second-hand information from several
sources and potentially its own first-hand information, it is more likely to be false.
Second, even when second-hand information is compatible, we only allow it to slightly
influence the reputation rating. We modified Bayesian model merging to implement
these mechanisms.
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Before taking into account this second-hand information to form A’s reputation rating
about C, A therefore checks whether the second-hand information is compatible with
the reputation rating it already has about C. As shown in Figure 4.1(c), assume that
E and G also had bad experience with C, so B, E, and G are compatible with A’s
accumulated reputation rating for C. Node F, however, praises C as well behaving,
thus deviating substantially from node A’s rating. In this case, A will let E’s, G’s, and
B’s second-hand information slightly influence its reputation rating about C, but it will
not consider the second-hand information received from F.
Nodes use the reputation ratings they keep about other nodes to classify them. This
classification provides a basis for decision-making about providing or accepting rout-
ing information, accepting a node as part of a route, and taking part in a route orig-
inated by some other node. Nodes classify other nodes as misbehaving if their rep-
utation rating is worse than their threshold for misbehavior tolerance. Once a node
classifies another as misbehaving, it isolates it from the network by not using it for
routing in forwarding and in turn not allowing to be used by it. As shown in Figure
4.1(d), in our scenario, C’s reputation rating as seen by A is no longer tolerable, there-
fore A classifies C as misbehaving. A proceeds to reroute its path to D that does not
contain C. In addition, when C wants A to forward packets for it or provide a route, A
will not respond. E,G, and B have detected the misbehavior of C already and isolated
it, now A is able to do that too.
4.2.2 Additional Features of CONFIDANT
In the previous section we described the basic features of CONFIDANT, now we
present some additional feature we have not explained above.
Trust. In addition to reputation ratings to keep track of the behavior of other nodes
in routing and forwarding, we let nodes keep track of the behavior of other nodes as
witnesses. We capture this behavior in what we call trust ratings. We use trust ratings
to speed up the detection by allowing to accept second-hand information coming from
a trusted node without checking for deviation. We do not assume any trust relations
between nodes, such as given by PGP for instance. We generate the trust ratings au-
tomatically by keeping track of the compatibility of the second-hand information they
provided. Nodes classify others as untrustworthy when their trust rating is worse than
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their threshold for deviation tolerance. In our scenario as depicted in Figure 4.1, A
improves the trust rating it has about E and B and worsens the one about F.
Merging first and second-hand information. We use a modified Bayesian approach
to represent and update the ratings that nodes keep about one another according to the
evidence given by first and second-hand information. Nodes give more weight to first-
hand information than to second-hand information received from others, therefore the
accepted information received from E,B, and G only slightly influences the reputation
rating A has about C.
Fading. To give more emphasis to recent behavior, we make nodes discount all ratings
periodically, we call this fading. This way, nodes cannot capitalize on previous good
behavior and we provide a means for redemption, as explained below.
Redemption and secondary response. We want to allow for redemption of isolated
nodes that are no longer misbehaving, e.g. when the bug of a formerly faulty node was
fixed. With fading, the reputation of an isolated node will eventually become tolerable,What is tolerance? – it
is the consequence of
humanity. We are all
formed of frailty and
error; let us pardon
reciprocally each
other’s folly – that is
the first law of nature. –
Voltaire
even when no direct observation is possible due to its isolation. This way, a node can
again participate in the network. If however, the node misbehaves, it will be isolated
again even faster than before. We achieve this by keeping track of which nodes have
misbehaved in the past and providing a strong secondary response by lowering the
misbehavior tolerance threshold. Suppose that after some time, C will come back to
the network and starts misbehaving again, as in Figure 4.1(a). A, having lowered its
tolerance toward C, will react faster this time and quickly isolate C, as in Figure 4.1(d).
Uncertainty of reputation and trust. Reputation and trust ratings are never pub-
lished, only first-hand information is broadcast locally. Nodes therefore cannot know
their reputation and trust as maintained by others. This prevents misbehavior strategies
based on knowledge about exact ratings and thresholds.
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4.3.1 Behavior Observability
In order to classify a node as normal or misbehaving, its behavior has to be observable I didn’t do it! Nobody
saw me do it! Can’t
prove anything! – Bart
Simpson
by other nodes. To ensure observability, we rely on two properties. One is that links
are bidirectional, which is the case when using off-the-shelf wireless network cards
based on IEEE 802.11. The second property is that routing information in the header
is unencrypted. This is the case even when using secure routing protocols based on
cryptographic means such as Ariadne [56] or SRP [103], where encrypted routing in-
formation is added but does not replace header fields. Link-layer encryption such as
WEP reduces observability but does not prevent it, since only the data part of IEEE
802.11 frames are encrypted. So far, WEP has been rejected for mobile ad-hoc net-
works due to its security flaws and its requirement for pairwise keys for each link. We
discuss the applicability of CONFIDANT with link-layer encryption in Chapter 9.
4.3.2 Identity
The question of identity is central to reputation systems. We require three properties of ”All my life I wanted to
be someone; I guess I
should have been more
specific.” – Jane
Wagner
identity which we call persistent, unique, and distinct. The requirement to be persistent
means that a node cannot easily change its identity. One way of achieving this is by ex-
pensive pseudonyms. This property is desirable for reputation systems to enable them
to gather the behavior history of a node. An identity is unique if no other node can use
it and thus impersonate another node. One way to ensure this is the use of cryptograph-
ically generated unique identifiers, as proposed by Montenegro and Castelluccia [89],
another is to use secure hardware modules such as the trusted platform module (TPM)
proposed by the trusted computing group (TCG) [49]. This property is needed to en- ”Why you say you no
bunny rabbit when you
have little powder-puff
tail? ” – The Tasmanian
Devil
sure that behavior observed was indeed that of the node observed. The requirement
of distinct identities is the target of the so-called Sybil attack analyzed by Douceur
[44], where nodes generate several identities for themselves to be used at the same
time. This property does not so much concern the reputation system itself, since those
identities that exhibit misbehavior will be excluded, while other identities stemming
from the same node will remain in the network as long as they behave well. The Sybil
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attack can, however, influence public opinion by having its rating considered more
than once. To prevent the Sybil attack, impersonation, and guaranteeing minimum
identity persistence, nodes with TPM could be required to register with a certification
and pseudonym authority that does not hand out more than one identity to a node at
a time and requires a minimum time to have elapsed before changing an identity. In
the scenario where the mobile ad-hoc network is not completely cut off the Internet,
we can make use of certification authorities. An example for such a scenario are pub-
licly accessible wireless LANs with Internet connection. The detection and isolation
of misbehaved nodes as achieved by a distributed reputation system for mobile ad-hoc
networks are still necessary, even in the presence of network operators. For the case of
a pure ad-hoc network without Internet connectivity or secure hardware, Weimerskirch
and Westhoff [118] propose zero-common knowledge authentication which provides
recognition of nodes that have been dealt with before, without requiring geographical
proximity. Relaxing the assumptions by including a loose time synchronization as well
as a temporary server connection and some data storage for pre-computed values, the
same authors provide identification without contact in the past [119]. Furthermore,
solutions based on public keys are under investigation, see for example [28].
4.4 Intentional vs. Accidental Misbehavior
Categorizations of misbehavior have been proposed, such as selfishness vs. malice.Never attribute to
malice that which can
adequately be
explained by stupidity.
– R. Feynmann
Although these types of misbehavior stem from a different motivation, they can be
generalized as intentional misbehavior. However, we also deem the consideration of
accidental misbehavior of high importance, and we think it is vital to protect the net-
work against misbehaving nodes regardless the nature of their intentions. Accidental
misbehavior can result in a node being unable to perform correctly due to a lack of
resources or due to its particular location in the network. CONFIDANT is indifferent
to the actual cause of the misbehavior, be it intentional or accidental. When a node is
classified as misbehaving it simply means that the node performs badly at routing or
forwarding. No moral judgment is implied.
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4.5 Protocol Components
The tasks CONFIDANT carries out are to gather information to classify first-hand ex-
perience, to exchange this information and to consider the second-hand information
thus received, to update the belief about the behavior of others, which we call the rep-
utation rating, taking into account both first and second-hand information, to classify
other nodes based on the reputation rating, and to adapt one’s own behavior according
to that classification.
CONFIDANT consists of several components that fulfill these tasks. The architecture
as shown in Figure 4.2 is modular and the single components can be exchanged to
accommodate the requirements of different environments or applications. We present
here the components we designed for coping with routing and forwarding misbehavior
in mobile ad-hoc networks running DSR.
Figure 4.2: CONFIDANT Components.
4.5.1 Monitor
The goal of the monitor is to gather first-hand information about the behavior of nodes
in the network. This is achieved by observing and classifying node behavior as normal
or misbehaving.
The monitor can detect misbehavior that can be distinguished from normal behavior
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by observation. We have implemented several types of misbehavior and their detec-
tion, namely packet dropping, illegitimate packet header modification, and route error
fabrication.Let us not look back in
anger or forward in
fear, but around us in
awareness. – James
Thurber The monitor is not limited to these types, others can be added as long as they satisfy the
requirement of observability. Although it is impossible to be certain to exhaustively list
all possible attacks, new types of observable misbehavior can be added to the monitor
once their signature is known without changing the protocol. This is possible since
there is only one message and it is independent of the type of misbehavior detected.
Due to the wireless medium and mobility, misbehavior and normal behavior can look
alike and thus provoke misclassification. For instance, a node could fail to overhear a
packet transmission attempt by the next hop due to a collision on the far side of the next
hop. We implemented the modified passive acknowledgment in a real Linux network
and found misclassification to be negligibly rare [23].
We call the information gained by direct experience by node   about node  first-
hand information (
 
) and use it as an input to the reputation system component of
CONFIDANT.
4.5.2 Reputation System
Reputation systems are used for example in some online auctioning systems. They
provide a means of obtaining a quality rating of participants of transactions by having
both the buyer and the seller give each other feedback on how their activities were per-
ceived and evaluated. The main idea behind the use of reputation systems is twofold.
First, it is used to serve as an incentive for good behavior to avoid the negative con-
sequences a bad reputation can entail. Second, it provides a basis for the choice of
prospective transaction partners. The most relevant properties of a reputation system
are the representation of reputation, how the reputation is built and updated, and for
the latter, how the ratings of others, i.e. second-hand information, are considered and
integrated. The reputation of a given node is the collection of ratings maintained by
others about this node.
In our approach the reputation system is fully distributed, and a node   maintains rat-
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ings about every other node  that is cares about. The reputation rating represents
the opinion formed by node   about node ’s behavior as an actor in the base system,
i.e. whether node  correctly participates in the routing protocol and forwarding. We
represent the reputation ratings that node   has about node  as data structure 
 
.
The use of second-hand information enables nodes to find out about misbehaving
nodes before making a bad experience. Also, in mobile ad-hoc networks, nodes might
not meet every node that they need for multi-hop forwarding, but with second-hand
information they can make informed decisions about which node to use for their paths.
4.5.3 Trust Manager
The task of the trust manager is to decide when to trust second-hand information and to
administer the trust given to other nodes. The goal is to minimize the risk of spurious
ratings while still making use of second-hand information received from others. Nobody believes the
official spokesman...
but everybody trusts an
unidentified source. –
Ron NesenThe trust rating represents node   ’s opinion about how honest node  is as an actor in
the reputation system (i.e. whether the reported first hand information summaries pub-
lished by node  are likely to be true). We represent the trust ratings as data structure

 
.
4.5.4 Path Manager
Once a node   classifies another node  as misbehaving,   isolates  from communica-
tions by not using  for routing and forwarding and by not allowing  to use  . This
isolation has three purposes. The first is to reduce the effect of misbehavior by depriv-
ing the misbehaving node of the opportunity to participate in the network. The second
purpose is to serve as an incentive to behave well in order not to be denied service.
Finally, the third purpose is to obtain better service by not using misbehaving nodes
on the path. The path manager performs the following functions:
Path re-ranking according to security metric (e.g. reputation of the nodes in the path),
deletion of paths containing misbehaving nodes, action on receiving a request for a
route from a misbehaving node (e.g. ignore, do not send any reply), and action on
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receiving request for a route containing a misbehaving node in the source route (e.g.
ignore, alert the source).
The path manager thus controls the topology as seen by an individual node. Misbe-
having nodes are not used for routing and forwarding and the path manager refuses to
be used by them.
4.6 Misbehavior Detection for DSR by Enhanced
Passive Acknowledgment
4.6.1 Passive Acknowledgment (PACK)
During packet forwarding every node is responsible confirming that the packet was
received by the next hop. There are three ways to get this acknowledgment, as specified
in the DSR draft [37]:
 Link-layer acknowledgment: this is supplied by the MAC layer.
 Passive acknowledgment: this confirmation comes indirectly by overhearing the
next node forward the packet.
 Network-layer acknowledgment: this is when nodes explicitly request a DSR
acknowledgment from the next hop.
Passive acknowledgment means that instead of waiting for an explicit acknowledgment
for each packet by the next-hop node on the route, a node assumes the correct reception
of the packet when it overhears the next-hop node forwarding the packet. PACK can
be used for Route Maintenance when originating or forwarding a packet along any
hop other than the last hop. PACK cannot be used with the last hop since it will
never retransmit a packet destined to itself. PACK needs two conditions to be applied:
nodes have their network interfaces in promiscuous mode, and network links operate
bidirectionally. The ranges for passive acknowledgment are shown in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Ranges for Passive Acknowledgment.
PACK works as follows. Thanks to the bi-directionality of the link-layer (IEEE 802.11b),
a node is able to find out whether the next node forwards its packet if both nodes are
still in the range of one another. This is possible because the node receives the packet
in promiscuous mode when the next node forwards it. When a node receives a packet
to be forwarded to a node other than last hop, the node sends the packet without re-
questing a network-layer acknowledgment (ACK). If it does not overhear the packet
forwarded, it means that the next hop either did not forward it or that it did forward
it but it was not overheard because the next-hop node moved out of range just after
receiving the packet to be forwarded. With the PACK retransmission mechanism, the
node waiting for the PACK resends the packet without network-layer ACK request.
After a certain number of trials, a network-layer ACK request must be used instead of
PACK for all remaining attempts for that packet. If it does not get acknowledged, it
emits a route error claiming that the next node is unreachable.
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When a node receives a new packet, it considers it as a PACK if the following checks
succeed:
 Source address, destination address, protocol identification and fragment offset
fields in the IP header of the two packets must match.
 If either packet contains a DSR Source Route header, both packets must contain
one, and the value in the Segments Left field (it indicates the number of hops
remaining until the destination) in the DSR Source Route header of the new
packet must be less than that in the first packet.
We use the simple passive acknowledgment not only for an indication of correct recep-
tion at the next hop, but also to detect if nodes fail to forward packets. We enhanced
the passive acknowledgment mechanism to detect several kinds of misbehavior. We
added capabilities to compare packets to detect the illegitimate modification of header
fields and the fabrication of messages. With our modified passive acknowledgment
mechanism, nodes make inferences from all messages overheard and classify behav-
ior as normal or misbehaving at each observation. Since the packets sent are logged
in a queue waiting to be acknowledged by PACK, it is straightforward to check some
additional fields to detect misbehavior in the flow of packets. The fact that PACK can-
not be used for the last hop, as explained above, has no influence on the misbehavior
detection capability since the destination has no incentive to drop its own packets and
no route tampering can be done.
The DSR draft [37] gives the fields we must check in order to consider the packet we
receive as a PACK. By checking the four fields of the IP header, we can identify a
packet uniquely so that we are sure we overheard one retransmission of the packet we
forward. Next, the DSR draft requires that if both packets have a source route option,
then the segments left value in the overheard packet must be less than in the logged
packet. This last check assures that the overheard packet is fresher than the logged
one.
In practice, however, most Linux versions now sometimes set the IP identity field to
zero for security reasons. This means for the use of passive acknowledgment, that
if we want to identify packets uniquely, we have to use other pieces of information.
We propose two solutions to this problem. The first is to generate a random identity
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number in the case when it has been set to zero. The second is to use the data contained
in the packet to uniquely identify it, without modifying the IP identity. We only need
to identify the packet uniquely if there is a need for retransmission and there would be
several packets eligible. For our purpose of detection of partial dropping, it suffices to
know that a packet was dropped that belonged to a particular path, regardless of which
packet it was exactly in the sequence.
In order to implement enhanced PACK to detect some attacks or events, every packet is
completely checked for changes when overheard. Thus, if a misbehaved node changes
one of the four IP fields we use to identify a PACK, the regular PACK was not able to
use our detection capabilities. We check the following fields and log if one of them
changes:
 IP header: The TTL value must be decremented by only one.
 Route reply option(s): All fields.
 Route error option(s): All fields.
 Source route option: If the Salvage value is unchanged, all fields except Segs
Left (we only check that this value decreases). If the Salvage flag changed, we
only check Type, Last Hop External, First Hop External and Segs Left (must
have decreased).
 Forged route error: a node can detect it, if the unreachable address in the route
error option is its own.
This new functionality detects the changes well. It detects all the attacks we imple-
mented that are based on modifications in the header, as described in Chapter 8.
4.6.2 Misbehavior Classification
In the following we give examples of attacks on DSR and classify them as dropping,
modification, fabrication, or timing attacks. We also state their potential detectability.
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4.6.2.1 Dropping Attacks
Drop all packets not destined to itself or perform only partial dropping. Partial drop-
ping can be restricted to specific types, such as only data packets, or route control
packets that contain it, or packets destined to specific nodes. The attacker can also
decide to drop only some of the packets listed above. The previous hop can detect
dropping by use of passive acknowledgment.
Avoid sending a ROUTE ERROR when having detected an error, to prevent other
nodes from looking for alternative routes. Thus, the source of the data packet will not
know that this route is disrupted and will not initiate a Route Discovery to find another
route. By using fake data packets sometimes, the initiator could confirm the validity
of the route if it receives a reply to this fake packet from the destination which cannot
interpret the data. To the previous hops using passive acknowledgment this looks like
dropping packets and can thus be detected as misbehavior.
4.6.2.2 Modification Attacks
By sending forged routing packets, an attacker can create a so-called black hole, a
node where all packets are discarded or all packets are lost. If the attacker itself is the
black hole and then just drops the packets, this can be detected by the neighbors using
passive acknowledgment. If the black hole is a virtual node or outside the network, it
is hard to detect. The attacker could also cause the route at all nodes of an area to point
into the black hole area when the destination is outside the network. This could be
done by sending forged ROUTE REPLY messages for example. The attack of using
an unreachable node as a black hole is not easily detectable since the last node on the
route that could not reach the destination will send a ROUTE ERROR back. If the
attacker drops the ROUTE ERROR, this can be detected. Otherwise, the source node
will initiate another route discovery process and the attacker will go undetected.
Attempt to make routes that go through oneself appear longer by adding some virtual
nodes to the route. Thus, a shorter route will be chosen avoiding this node. When the
attacker receives a ROUTE REQUEST, it replies with a ROUTE REPLY as if the route
were already in its route cache, but it adds some virtual nodes to make the route longer.
It could also modify (add some virtual nodes) and forward the ROUTE REQUEST. As
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the ROUTE REPLY comes back, it removes the virtual nodes and forwards the packet.
By use of enhanced passive acknowledgment to detect tampering, adding nodes can be
detected. In the same way, an attacker can remove itself to be avoided, this can also be
detected by passive acknowledgment.
Change the Last Hop External flag in the ROUTE REPLY to make this route less
interesting for the initiator of the route discovery. This modification can be detected
by enhanced passive acknowledgment.
Salvage routes that are not broken and redirect a data packet to consume bandwidth
and energy, or to deviate traffic for malicious purposes. When the attacker receives a
data packet, it changes the route of the packet and also sends a ROUTE ERROR to the
source to indicate the change of route. Thus, the source will delete the original route
of its cache and will use the new route next time. It can potentially be detected when
the next hop overhears the ROUTE ERROR containing itself.
To create a routing loop, an attacker could send forged routing packets that cause pack-
ets traversing nodes in a cycle without reaching their destination, consuming band-
width and power. This could be detected if nodes check for loops in the source route
not only when forwarding a ROUTE REQUEST. If, however, the attacker manages
to use two different addresses for one node, it is not detectable from inspecting the
header.
Modify the nodes list in the header of a ROUTE REQUEST or a ROUTE REPLY to
misroute packets and to add incorrect routes in the route cache of other nodes. The
attacker could add, remove or change any node in the header of the packet, disturbing
route discovery and causing nodes to misroute packets. This attack could be detected
by the previous node by means of enhanced passive acknowledgment.
Decrease the hop count (TTL) when receiving a packet, so that the packet will never
be received by the destination. This attack could be detected by the previous node in
route by enhanced passive acknowledgment.
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4.6.2.3 Fabrication Attacks
An attacker could forge ROUTE ERROR packets causing nodes to incorrectly remove
working routes from their route cache. In the worst case, this attack could prevent
a node from being able to route any packets. Every time a node receives a ROUTE
ERROR, it must remove this route from its route cache and broadcast this information
to its neighbors. The difficulty for the attacker is to emit a ROUTE ERROR for a route
that exists in the Route cache of the victim. The attacker must take part to the route
too, otherwise it could not send this ROUTE ERROR without suspicion. This attack is
difficult to detect for the nodes that are not mentioned in the ROUTE ERROR, since it
is not possible distinguish a normal gratuitous ROUTE ERROR from a forged ROUTE
ERROR.
Send spoofed ROUTE REQUESTs with subsequent sequence query id, so that the next
ROUTE REQUESTs from the spoofed node will be discarded by the nodes since they
already saw them. No ROUTE REPLY will come back since the destinations do not
exist. Thus, when the victim will initiate new ROUTE REQUEST, nodes will discard
them because they have already seen the same originating address associated with
the same id. Its detection is limited to the spoofed node when it receives a ROUTE
REQUEST supposedly originated by itself and to nodes appearing in the route that
have not received the request before.
Forge ROUTE REPLY packets causing nodes to misroute packets and to add incorrect
routes in their route cache. The nodes that overhear it must update their route cache.
Thus, they will misroute packets and consume energy and bandwidth. This is hard to
detect.
Initiate frequent ROUTE REQUEST to consume bandwidth and energy and to cause
congestion. The attacker could initiate ROUTE REQUEST for the same destination or
for another destination every packet. Since ROUTE REQUEST are broadcast, it costs
a lot of bandwidth and energy. In the first case, the event cannot be seen as a normal
event. In the second case, there is an uncertainty over the behavior of the node.
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4.6.2.4 Timing Attacks
Send route replies with a time not proportional to the length of the route. This can
give more priority to long routes thus attracting routes to the attacker, or less priority
to short routes thus avoiding the attacker. It is easy to mount. It can be observed when
nodes wait for several routes to arrive and checking their length before adding them to
the route cache.
4.7 Behavior Representation, a Bayesian
Approach

 
contains the behavior of  as seen by  . Node   models the behavior of node  as
an actor in the network as follows. Node   thinks that there is a parameter  such that
node  misbehaves with probability , and that the outcome is drawn independently
from observation to observation (Node   thinks that there is a different parameter 
for every different node , and every node   may believe in different parameters ;
thus  should be indexed by   and , but for brevity, we omit the indices here). The
parameters  are unknown, and node   models this uncertainty by assuming that  itself
is drawn according to a distribution (the prior) that is updated as new observations
become available. This is the standard Bayesian framework. We use for the prior the
distribution Beta  , as is commonly done [9].
The standard Bayesian procedure is as follows. Initially, the prior is Beta  , the
uniform distribution on  	; this represents absence of information about which  will
be drawn. Then, when a new observation is made, say with 	 observed misbehaviors
and 
 observed correct behaviors, the prior is updated according to  
   	 and
 
   
 . If , the true unknown value, is constant, then after a large number
 of observations,    (in expectation),       and Beta   becomes
close to a Dirac at , as expected. The advantage of using the Beta function is that it
only needs two parameters that are continuously updated as observations are made or
reported. See Figure 4.4 (the actual calculation of the density has been carried out here
for illustrative purpose only).
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Figure 4.4 illustrates how 
 
changes with updates.
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Figure 4.4: Density of the Beta Function.
4.7.1 Using Second-Hand Information
Information Dissemination. We do not assume synchronized clocks for periodic in-
formation exchange among nodes and yet we want to avoid polling of other nodes.
Therefore, we propose each node publish its ratings from time to time. Since at the re-
ceiving end the disseminated ratings will trickle in in irregular intervals a node cannot
know how many witnesses will share their ratings and thus cannot assign weights ac-
cording to the number of witnesses. In order to make weighting feasible nevertheless
we distinguish only between two types, namely the weight for one’s own observation,
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termed first-hand, and the weight for testimonials by others, termed second-hand. The Men trust their ears
less than their eyes.
Herodotus (485 BC -
425 BC), The Histories
of Herodotus
weight for second-hand information is a fixed small fraction of the weight for first-hand
information.
4.7.2 Using Trust
To speed up detection, nodes can also use trust to accept second-hand information
even if it is incompatible. Trust rating uses a similar Bayesian approach as reputation
rating. Node   thinks that there is a parameter  such that node  gives false reports
with probability , so it uses for  the prior Beta   Æ. The trust rating 
 
is equal to
   Æ.
Initially,    Æ    . Then an update is performed whenever node   receives a
reported by some node  on first-hand information about node . Let 	   if the
deviation test in Equation (5.3) succeeds, and 	   otherwise. The trust rating 
 

   Æ is updated by
 
 !  	 (4.1)
Æ 
 !Æ    	 (4.2)
Here ! is the discount factor for trust, similar to ". There is a similar update in periods
of inactivity as for first hand information.
Note that the deviation test is always performed, whether  is considered trustworthy
by   or not. In the former case, it is used only to update 
 
; in the latter case, it is used
to update 
 
and to decide whether to update 
 
.
4.7.3 Making Decisions
Every time node   updates its ratings about , it checks whether it is still within the
boundaries of its misbehavior tolerance. This is done to provide a basis for decisions
about how to treat .
The decision-making process works as follows. First, the posterior according to all
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the given data is calculated. This is done by node   by updating 
 
  

 

 and

 
    Æ as explained above. Then node   chooses the decision with minimal loss.
As commonly done, we use squared-error loss for the deviation from the true  and
; this amounts to considering    Beta    for  and    Beta   Æ for . More
precisely:
Node   classifies the behavior of node  as

normal if    Beta     #
misbehaved if    Beta     #
(4.3)
and the trustworthiness of node  as

trustworthy if    Beta   Æ  $
untrustworthy if    Beta   Æ  $
(4.4)
The thresholds # and $ are an expression of tolerance. If node   tolerates a node  that
misbehaves not more than half of the time, it should set # to 0.5. In analogy, if   trusts
a node if its ratings deviate no more than in 25% of the cases, it sets its $ to 0.75. The
classification is shown in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Node Classification.
Figure 4.6 shows a diagram of how first, second-hand and trust information influence
the classification of nodes.
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Figure 4.6: Reputation System.
4.7.4 Redemption
Redemption. Our solution enforces redemption of nodes over time, by the combi-
nation of two mechanisms: periodic re-evaluation and reputation fading. Periodic
re-evaluation is implemented by the fact that node classification is performed period-
ically. It is thus possible for a node to redeem itself, given that nodes have each their
own reputation belief which is not necessarily shared by all the others. Since their
opinions can differ, a node is most probably not excluded by all other nodes and can
thus partially participate in the network with the potential of showing its good behavior.
Even if this is not the case and the suspect is excluded by everyone it can redeem itself
by means of the second mechanism. Reputation fading is implemented by our modi-
fication to the Bayesian update of the posterior, which decays exponentially. Contrary
to standard Bayesian estimation, this gives more weight to recent observations. We
also periodically discount the rating in the absence of testimonials and observations.
4.7.5 Secondary Response
When the bad reputation of a node has faded during isolation, it can gradually be re-
admitted to the network. If it continues to misbehave, we want to benefit from having
learned about its misbehavior in the past and react faster than without this knowledge.
For this purpose, nodes keep a list of nodes they formerly excluded. The tolerance
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shown toward these nodes is lowered by decreasing the misbehavior threshold. This
way they are classified as misbehaving at lower levels of misbehavior than before.
4.7.6 Punishing Liars?
If we punish nodes for their seemingly inaccurate testimonials, we might end up pun-
ishing the messenger and thus discourage honest reporting of observed misbehavior.
Note that we evaluate testimonial accuracy according to affinity to the belief of the
requesting node along with the overall belief of the network as gathered over time.
The accuracy is not measured as compared to the actual true behavior of a node, since
the latter is unknown and can not be proved beyond doubt. Even if it were possible
to test a node and obtain a truthful verdict on its nature, a contradicting previous testi-
monial could still be accurate. Thus, instead of punishing deviating views we restrict
our system to merely reduce their impact on public opinion. Some node is bound to
be the first witness of a node misbehaving, thus starting to deviate from public opin-
ion. Punishing this discovery would be counterproductive, as the goal is precisely to
learn about misbehaved nodes even before having had to make a bad experience in
direct encounter. There is a trade-off for trust management versus just checking each
testimonial independent from its source.
4.8 Protocol Messages: PublicRating
There is only one message sent in the CONFIDANT protocol. Nodes periodicallyEvery word is like an
unnecessary stain on
silence and
nothingness.
– Beckett
publish their first-hand information in a local broadcast of TTL 1. We call this message
public rating. It consists of a list of all nodes about which the publishing keeps track
and their respective ratings given as the two parameters  and . The format of the
message is as follows.
The message header is preceded by the standard fixed part of a DSR header:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
4.8 Protocol Messages: PublicRating 57
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Header |F| Reserved | Payload Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
. .
. Options .
. .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The public rating is a DSR option, just as other DSR control messages such as route
request or route reply. The format of the public rating option is the following.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Option Type | Opt Data Len | Identification |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Address[1] |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Rating[1] |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Address[2] |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Address[n] |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The Option Type is set to 10, a number not reserved for other DSR options. The
Opt Data Len field is set to the total length of the option. The Identification field is
used to differentiate public rating messages coming from a node. The Address and
Rating fields contain the addresses of the nodes the publisher keeps track of and their
respective ratings as captured in the first-hand information.
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5 Protocol Walk-Through
“What saves a man is to take a step. Then another
step. It is always the same step, but you have to
take it.”
Antoine de Saint-Exupery
In this section, we present how CONFIDANT works by going through the protocol
step by step and explaining the relevant concepts along the way.
5.1 Bootstrapping, Sending a Packet
When a CONFIDANT node, say node  , joins a mobile ad-hoc network running DSR,
its path cache is empty and it has no first-information, trust, or reputation ratings about
others. When it has a packet to send, it first sends out a route request, and after receiv-
ing route replies according to DSR, it choses the shortest path and puts it in its route
cache. Let node  be the next-hop node on the source route to the destination. Node  
then sends its packet to node .
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5.2 Monitoring by Enhanced Passive
Acknowledgment
After sending the packet to node , node   puts packet information into the queue for
passive acknowledgment (PACK) and sets a PACK timer. Every time   overhears a
packet, it checks whether it matches an entry in the PACK table.
5.3 Gathering First-Hand Information
Node   overhears  forward the packet to the next hop on the route, say node . It
compares the overheard packet with the information in the PACK queue and verifies,
that the changes are legitimate. It thus infers correct reception of the packet by  and
the attempt of  to forward it to . Node   interprets this as normal behavior by 
and removes the packet from the PACK queue. To reflect this observation of , node  
creates a first-hand information rating for , which we call 
 
.
5.4 Updating First-Hand Information
The first-hand information record 
 
has the form   . It represents the parameters
of the Beta distribution assumed by node   in its Bayesian view of node ’s behavior
as an actor in the network. Initially, it is set to   .
The standard Bayesian method gives the same weight to each observation, regardless
of its time of occurrence. We want to give less weight to evidence received in the past
to allow for reputation fading. We therefore developed a modified Bayesian update
approach by introducing a moving weighted average as follows.
Node   just made one individual observation about ; let 	   if this observation is
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qualified as misbehavior by CONFIDANT, and 	   otherwise. The update is
 
 " 	 (5.1)
 
 "    	 (5.2)
The weight " is a discount factor for past experiences, which serves as the fading
mechanism.
In our case, node   classified the behavior of node  as normal, since it overheard the
packet re-transmission and detected no illegitimate changes, therefore 
 
 
 
 " "
.
In addition, during inactivity periods, we periodically decay the values of   as fol-
lows. Whenever the inactivity time expires, we let  
 " and  
 ". This is
to allow for redemption even in the absence of observations. Node   thus periodically
discounts the parameters of 
 
.
5.5 Updating Reputation Ratings
When node   updates its first-hand information 
 
, it also updates its reputation rating
for , namely 
 
in the same way.
The reputation rating 
 
is also defined by two numbers, say    . Initially, it is
set to   . It is updated on two types of events: (1) when first-hand observation is
updated (2) when a reputation rating published by some other node is copied. Here we
discuss the first case.
So far, node   has made one first-hand observation of node . Since it made a positive
experience with node , it changes 
 
 
 
 "

 "

 . If the update to the
first-hand information is due to inactivity, the formula is   
 ",   
 " .
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5.5.1 Exchanging Information, Using Second-Hand
Information Without Trust
From time to time every node publishes its first-hand information in a local broadcast
with TTL set to 1. Node   thus sends out its 
 
. When it hears the first-hand infor-
mation from some other node, say , it performs a deviation test for compatibility as
follows. We denote with    Beta   the expectation of the distribution Beta  .
Let 

  


 


 and 
 
    The deviation test is
   Beta 


 


    Beta     (5.3)
where  is a positive constant (deviation threshold). If the deviation test is positive,
the first hand information 

is considered incompatible and is not used. Else 

is incorporated using linear pool model merging as explained in Section 2 and [9], as
follows. 

is considered by node   who modifies 
 
according to

 

 
 
 

(5.4)
Here,  is a small positive constant giving less weight to second-hand information.
This is performed for all  contained in the second-hand information received from .
5.5.2 Using Trust
To speed up detection, nodes can also use trust to accept second-hand information even
if it is incompatible. Assume node   receives the reported first-hand information 

from node . If 
 
is high enough, it will accept 

to slightly modify its own 
 
even if it fails the deviation test. Node   updates 
 
in any case. If  passed the
deviation test, Æ will be increased, otherwise  .
5.5.3 Classifying Nodes
Every time node   updates its ratings about , it checks whether it is still within the
boundaries of its misbehavior tolerance. This is done to provide a basis for decisions
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about how to treat . Node   thus classifies  as normal, if 
 
is smaller than $, as
misbehaved otherwise.
5.6 Sending Packets, Detecting Misbehavior
For each packet node   sends, it keeps the same procedure of storing the information in
the PACK queue and setting the PACK timer. When the PACK timer goes off, it means
that node   did not overhear the retransmission of the packet by the next hop . In this
case, node   interprets this as an instance of misbehavior by node  and updates its first-
hand information and reputation rating about , such that 
 
   
 
 
 " "
and 
 
 

 

 
 
 
 "

  "

. The PACK timer going off is only one case of a
misbehavior indication, another one is when node   detects an illegitimate modification
of the packet when it overhears the retransmission by . When there are no packets
being sent, node   updates 
 
and 
 
using the decay factor ".
5.7 Managing Paths
When   classifies  as misbehaving, it deletes all routes containing node  from its path
cache. If it still has packets to send and there is an alternate path that does not include
, node   proceeds to send packets over that path, otherwise it sends out a new route
request. In addition, node   puts node  on its list of misbehaving nodes and increases
its reputation tolerance threshold #.
Assume now that node  wants the services of node   for forwarding a packet node
originating from  or providing a route for . Node   denies service to  in order to
retaliate and isolate it.
In our approach, we do not punish nodes that are categorized as untrustworthy but
merely restrict their influence. The reasons for this are that testimonial inaccuracy can
not be proved beyond doubt, deviations can arise because nodes discover misbehavior
before others do, and punishment discourages the publication of ratings.
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5.8 Redemption and Secondary Response
Due to the fading mechanism that discounts reputation ratings over time by the factor
", node  ’s reputation rating of  returns to neutral after a while, if there is not enough
second-hand information due to a lack of observation opportunity when a node is iso-
lated. Assume that enough time has passed to allow for the redemption of node  and it
is no longer isolated by  . Node   continues to keep track of the behavior of . If node
 starts to misbehave again,   will isolate it faster than the first time as a secondary
response, since  is on the list of misbehaving nodes and its classification is more strict
due to the decreased tolerance.
5.9 Lying Nodes
5.9.1 Big Lies
When node   wants to get another node  excluded from the network, it can try to
worsen the reputation of . Node   can claim in its published
 
that it has encountered
and observed  many times and that the experience has been predominantly bad. Node
  thus publishes a 
 
with a very high  and low . A node  for instance hears  
publish 
 
. If  has no prior first-hand information of , the deviation from its own
   Beta  , which amounts to 0.5 due to the non-informative prior of Beta  ,
will be smaller than the threshold # if # 	 . Node   could thus pass the deviation
test at node  and slightly modify 

. Since it only modifies it only slightly, also
true reports by other nodes will still pass the deviation test. Assuming the majority
of nodes to report truthfully, and given the possibility that  encounters , over time,
node   will no longer pass the deviation test with its 
 
. Also, everytime it fails the
deviation test, its trust rating at node , 
 
deteriorates.
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5.9.2 Stealth
Since big lies only work if there is no contradicting published first-hand information
from other nodes or indeed first-hand information about  gathered by  itself, node  
might try to worsen the reputation of  by stealth. It can slightly increase  and lower
 in its published 
 
. If the approach is stealthy enough, i.e., the changes of  and 
are very small, it will pass the deviation test with  and be considered to, again, slightly
modify 

. Node , however, also considers other published first-hand information
and its own. Additionaly, note that ratings are discounted over time by reputation
fading, which further limits the influence of node  ’s stealthy lies.
5.10 Colluding Nodes: Brainwashing
Consider the situation where node, say  , has no first-hand information about another To repeat what others
have said, requires
education; to challenge
it, requires brains.
Mary Pettibone Poole,
A Glass Eye at a
Keyhole, 1938
node, say , but has second-hand information about  gathered from the neighborhood.
Assume that   happens to be surrounded by untrustworthy nodes that over time make
it believe that  is misbehaving. When   later moves to a different neighborhood with
honest nodes, it will not believe them since they deviate too much from its reputation
rating of . We call this being brainwashed. Our approach does not prevent brainwash-
ing, but over time  ’s rating of  will return to neutral by fading and   can recover.
5.11 Intoxication and Binge Misbehavior
If nodes use the trust option to allow incompatible second-hand information to be used
in order to speed up detection, nodes could try to gain trust from others by telling
the truth over a sustained period of time and only then start lying. To exacerbate that
problem, nodes could also just reflect the second-hand information they receive from
others and publish it as their first-hand information without having to have actual first-
hand information themselves. We call this intoxication. This effect is mitigated by
two properties of our approach. First, fading discounts trust gained in the past and
recent deviations reduce trust more strongly. Second, in telling the truth or publishing
whichever information passes the deviation test, they actually reinforce the reputation
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ratings other nodes have, making it harder to have their then deviating information be
accepted. The same effect can be seen if node   behaves well for a long time and builds
up a good reputation and then starts to misbehave, exploiting its good reputation. For
the same mechanisms as the intoxication, node   can only go on a short misbehavior
binge before being its reputation deteriorates.
5.12 A Typical Scenario
Figures 5.1 to 5.6 show a typical scenario with Beta densities of ratings.
Figure 5.1: Reputation and Trust Ratings.
Figure 5.2: Publishing Ratings.
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Figure 5.3: E Rates Nodes.
Figure 5.4: Lying Nodes.
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Figure 5.5: Deviation Test.
Figure 5.6: Updating Ratings.
Chapter
6 Performance Analysis
“The health of a democratic society may be mea-
sured by the quality of functions performed by pri-
vate citizens.”
Alexis de Tocqueville
6.1 GloMoSim Simulation with DSR
6.1.1 Goals and Metrics
The objective of this performance analysis is to determine the impact of the CONFI-
DANT routing protocol extensions on metrics described below in an ad-hoc network
where a part of the population misbehaves. The regular DSR protocol is used as a
reference. Our goal is also to learn how protocol parameters such as thresholds should
be set.
The following metrics are considered.
Throughput, Goodput, Dropped Packets. One metric is the resulting total good-
put % of a network with  nodes, i.e. the data forwarded to the correct destina-
tion. We express this as:
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% 
 

  
& !
 

  
'# ( )$
(6.1)
As opposed to the throughput, packet loss and retransmissions are taken into
account. The goodput is directly influenced by packet loss. Packet loss can occur
due to general network conditions causing link errors or unreachable nodes, but
packets can also be lost because an intermediate node intentionally drops them.
The latter is the only form of packet loss directly attributable to misbehavior. We
therefore use the number of intentionally dropped packets as a metric, both in
absolute numbers and relative to the number of packets originated.
Overhead. Since the cost of internal computation in terms of energy consumption
is negligible compared to the cost of a transmission, we look at the overhead
caused by extra messages.
The overhead directly caused by CONFIDANT is measured by the number of
first-hand publications per node broadcast with a TTL of 1. It depends only on
the chosen timer between publications, in this scenario the timer is set to 10s.
These publications do not get forwarded. Storage overhead are the three ratings,

 
, 
 
, and 
 
, that each node   stores about each node  that it cares about.
The ratings consist of two parameters each.
ROUTE-REQUEST, ROUTE-REPLY and ERROR messages in the case of DSR
or, to be more general, any messages needed for rerouting depend on the under-
lying routing protocol. The CONFIDANT protocol points out the identity of
misbehaving nodes and allows the routing protocol to reroute around them.
Detection Time. We are interested in how long it takes until a misbehaving node is
detected by all nodes in the network.
False Positives and Negatives. False positives mean that a node wrongly classi-
fied a node as misbehaving, false negatives mean that a node classified another
as regular although it is misbehaving. False positives and negatives are measured
at the end of the simulation.
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6.1.2 Simulation Setup
For the performance analysis of the protocol extensions, the metrics are observed in
various network scenarios given by different modifications of the DSR protocol. The
first network we analyze is a regular well-behaved DSR network which is used as a
reference.
We then introduce misbehaving nodes that do not cooperate. These misbehaving nodes
do not forward messages for other nodes. The next kind of network we use for anal-
ysis is a network containing a certain fraction of misbehaving nodes but no defense
mechanism, we call it ‘defenseless’.
Then we use a version of DSR that we enhanced with CONFIDANT extensions and
refer to it as ‘fortified’. The first enhancement toward a fortified network is the reaction
of a node on its own bad experience. If a node notices that its next-hop neighbor does
not forward, it will avoid that node for future communications. The second enhance-
ment is to include the case when the neighbor node fails to forward a packet for some
other node and it is detected. The third enhancement is given by taking into account
published ratings by others.
Out of the variety of routing and forwarding attacks on DSR, we concentrate on for-
warding defection for this performance analysis, because its impact on network per-
formance can be measured directly.
The simulation is implemented on GloMoSim [129], a simulator for mobile ad-hoc
networks. Unless otherwise specified, the experiments were repeated twenty times
with varying random seed. The seed influences the placement and movement of the
nodes. Whenever confidence intervals are shown in plots, the confidence level on these
intervals is 95 %.
6.1.3 Factors and Parameters
The fixed parameters for the simulation are listed in Table 6.1. The radio range, send-
ing capacity and MAC have been chosen to represent an off-the-shelf device. The mo-
bility model chosen is the Random Waypoint Model, in which nodes move to a random
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Parameter Level
Area 1000 m 
 1000 m
Speed uniformly distributed
between 5 and 20 m/s
Radio Range 250 m
Placement uniform
Movement random waypoint model
MAC 802.11
Sending capacity 2 Mbps
Application CBR
Packet size 64 B
Passive ack period 100 ms
Simulation time 900 s
Number of nodes 50
Pause time 100 s
Weight  0.1
Publication timer 1 s
Threshold $ 0.25
Threshold # 0.75
Table 6.1: Fixed Parameters
destination at a speed uniformly distributed between 0 m/s and a specified maximum
speed. Once they reach this destination, they stay there for as long as specified in the
pause time parameter. The reason for this movement model is to have a random move-
ment with pauses with the aim to reflect realistic user behavior. The speed is uniformly
distributed between 5 and 20 m/s to offer a range of users that are walking or driving
a car; the minimum speed is chosen so high to overcome the non-stationary problem
of the random waypoint model [125]. The chosen area approximately represents the
center of a town. The simulation time is chosen to be long enough to potentially roam
the whole area. The placement has been chosen to start with a good network connec-
tivity over the whole area. Finally, CBR has been chosen for traffic (we refer to it as
applications) to avoid protocol particularities of more complicated protocols such as
TCP. The application is defined as follows. A client constantly sends to a server which
in turn responds to the client. The client-server-pairs have been randomly generated
for the simulation. The factors varied are the total number of nodes in the network, the
percentage of misbehaving nodes, the pause time and the number of applications.
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Figure 6.1: Only Misbehavior: Throughput, 50 nodes, 30 applications, 0 pause time,
varying percentage of misbehaving nodes.
6.1.4 Misbehavior Without Liars Experiment
In this scenario, some nodes misbehave by dropping packets they are supposed to for-
ward for others. We chose this type of misbehavior for its direct impact on throughput
and simplicity. Figure 6.1 shows the successful throughput (goodput) for a network
where nodes move continuously without pause time. We compare the performance of
CONFIDANT versus regular DSR without defense. It shows that CONFIDANT can
cope with a misbehaving population rate of about up to 50%.
Figure 6.2 shows the mean detection time of all misbehaved nodes. The use of second-
hand information shortens the detection time.
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Figure 6.2: Without Liars: With Mean Detection Time of All Misbehaved Nodes.
74 Performance Analysis
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 0  20  40  60  80  100
go
od
pu
t: 
ra
tio
 o
f p
ac
ke
ts
 re
ce
ive
d 
to
 o
rig
in
at
ed
percentage of malicious nodes
DSR with CONFIDANT
Regular DSR
Changing Identities
Figure 6.3: Effect of Changing Identities.
Figure ?? shows that when mobility is low, it is beneficial for nodes to exchange in-
formation not only locally with their neighbors but over a wider range. The overhead
of publishing more widely has to be traded off against the detection speed-up gained.
In networks with predominantly short routes, local broadcast and taking into account
end-to-end information are not much slower.
6.1.4.1 Effect of Changing Identities
To simulate changing identities, relaxing our assumption about identity persistence, we
let nodes forget their ratings of other nodes from time to time (uniformly distributed
between 2 and 10 minutes). Figure 6.3 shows that the throughput achieved this way
is lower than in CONFIDANT with persistent identities, but still substantially higher
than in a defenseless network.
6.1.5 Misbehavior With Liars Experiment
Figure 6.4 shows the mean detection time, i.e., the time in the simulation when the last
node detected a particular misbehaved node, vs. which fraction of the misbehaving
nodes were detected by all at that time. To show the effect of presence or absence of the
reputation system model merging, we set , the weight for second-hand observations,
to 0.1 and 0, the latter meaning that nodes do not consider second-hand information at
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Figure 6.4: With Liars: With Mean Detection Time of All Misbehaved Nodes.
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Figure 6.5: With Liars: Max Detection Time of All Misbehaved Nodes.
all. This enables us to compare the use of second-hand reports to relying exclusively
on first-hand observation.
Although the percentage of untrustworthy nodes that reversed their first-hand infor-
mation ratings when publishing is as high as 50% in this particular set of experiment
runs, it nevertheless pays off to consider compatible second-hand reports. The time for
detection of misbehaved nodes is significantly shorter.
6.1.5.1 Effect of Using Trust
The potential drawback of using a  *  in terms of false positives is shown in Figure
6.6. Here, the results depend on how trust is handled. To simulate the effect of the
trust component and its absence, we set the threshold $ to 0.25 and to 1, the latter
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Figure 6.7: False Negatives with Increased Untrustworthy Population.
meaning a node trusts anyone. Both the false positives and negatives are limited by the
having the effect of the deviation test come into play as the trust threshold is set to a
small value that expresses trust only when the source of the report has been evaluated
as trustworthy in the past. The smaller the trust threshold, the smaller the probability
of a record to be accepted for model merging, yet even then it improves the decision
making of a node.
The numbers of false positives and negatives do not vary much with the increase of the
proportion of untrustworthy nodes, here from 0.1 to 0.5 and 0.9, if the trust threshold
$ is significantly smaller than 1 and provided that nodes have first-hand information
about most of the other nodes.
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The ratio of false positives and negatives to correct positives and negatives, respec-
tively, depend on the simulation time and the frequency of re-evaluation in our simu-
lation, because the misbehavior is constant over time here.
6.1.5.2 Liar strategies
Untrustworthy nodes can have different strategies to publish their falsified first-hand
information in an attempt to influence reputation ratings, e.g. when they want to dis-
credit regular nodes or raise the reputation of misbehaving nodes. The basic strategies
consist of changing the parameter , denoting misbehavior instances, or , denoting
regular behavior, or both. These can then also be mixed or applied only occasionally.
If for example both parameters are changed by swapping them, they will not pass the
deviation test explained in Equation 5.3. Consider the strategy to worsen the pub-
lished information about a node, the case of artificially improving it is analogous. If
the worsening is considerable, it will not pass the deviation test. A more sophisticated
alternative is a stealthy approach where the published information about another node
is only worsened a little. Although nodes do not know the content of the reputation Don’t tell any big lies
today. Small ones can
be just as effective. –
fortune cookie
ratings held by others, they could try to make an inference from the first-hand infor-
mation nodes publish to make an estimation. They could then try to lie only so much
as to just pass the deviation test. Even when this is successful, the impact is very small
as it, having passed the deviation test, only differs slightly from the reputation rating a
node already has. The impact is further reduced by fading and by the limited frequency
by which nodes consider second-hand information by another node. Figure 6.8 shows
that stealthy lying only negligibly slows down detection.
6.2 R Simulation
6.2.1 Goals and Metrics
By means of simulation, we want to investigate the robustness and efficiency of our
distributed reputation system in a mobile ad-hoc network. The key questions addressed
are
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Figure 6.8: Stealthy Liars.
 How long does it take until a misbehaving node is detected, using first-hand
information only, using also second-hand information, i.e., the first-hand infor-
mation of others, or even more indirect disseminated information?
 What is the effect of false accusations and can they be detected?
 With whom should information be exchanged – with neighbors or remote nodes?
 And, what is the effect of mobility?
6.2.2 Simulation Setup
The simulation was implemented in R [61, 116]. To simulate regular and misbehavior,
neighborhood, observation mistakes, movement, and reputation updates, we used a
grid of nodes. We investigated and compared the effect of using first-hand information
only, using also second-hand information in a network with no false accusations, and
using also second-hand information in a network with liars but discarding too deviant
ratings.
6.2.3 System Model
The nodes are placed on a grid, to simulate a communications range of one hop, and
they observe the behavior of their neighborhood. Depending on its position in the
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grid, a node has up to 8 neighbors. A node can only directly observe neighbors, i.e.,
node   at row  and column , denoted as  

, can observe any neighboring node
 in its row 

, in its column 

, or diagonally one hop away


.
Periodically, nodes move around. We emulate this with the following algorithms.
Local movement. We pick a node at random, say node  

and randomly select a
new location     for it such that         	 and        	
to keep the movement reasonably local. We then repeat this with the node that
we find at     and so on, until the new location is the original    and the
permutation cycle is completed.
Local plus far movement. Most of the time the nodes move within a two-hop
radius as described above, but sporadically they choose a location with long-
distance hops.
Random movement. With this movement model, the new position of the nodes is
a random permutation of the previous position.
Before moving away, nodes exchange reputation information in the form of Beta pa-
rameters. We have different models for the choice of witnesses.
Neighbors. Nodes exchange their reputation information with all nodes that are
reachable within one hop. This way, the information dissemination does not
need routing nor uses resources across the network.
A random set of nodes. Nodes pick their witnesses at random, so the information
does not only spread locally but to wherever the chosen nodes are located at the
moment of exchange. In a mobile ad-hoc network this model would consume
more network resources than th neighbor model.
Friends. Again, the choice of witnesses is independent of location, but this time it is
always the same set of nodes used to exchange ratings.
At each exchange the nodes give their ratings the way they stored their first-hand in-
formation. Liars apply different strategies to give false ratings. We thus have the
following liar models.
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Reverse. When a node  lies, it swaps the  and  of its Beta

   for all nodes 
represented by 

before disclosing it to the neighbors for model comparison.
Worsen. Liars increase  of regular nodes by 20%.
Improve. Liars increase  of misbehaving nodes by 20%.
This whole process of observing, exchanging ratings, and moving is iterated until all
of the misbehaving nodes are classified as detected by all of the nodes in the net-
work, which is the case when the expected value of the reputation,     represented
by    
 
, exceeds a threshold of 0.75. As a rehabilitation mechanism to mitigate
the effect of false accusations, the nodes periodically review their reputation ratings
and reverse their classification from “detected“ to “regular” when the reputation is
substantially better than the detection threshold.
The threshold used to determine when to exclude a suspect liar’s rating depends on the
priorities. As is typical for diagnosis systems, there is a trade-off between minimizing
false positives or false negatives. We chose a threshold of 50% deviation to err on
the side of false positives, i.e., the mechanism excludes some true information but
reliably prevents false accusations from having an impact. This way the robustness is
maintained at the price of an unused detection speed-up potential.
6.2.4 Scenarios
We evaluate six scenarios that differ in whether disseminated information is considered
at all, what kind of disseminated information is considered, and how it is integrated in
the rating of a node. The following is a list of these scenarios with their names as they
are used in the simulation.
First-hand information. 

   denotes the nodes that node   can observe during the
time interval $, i.e. the grid neighbors. Each node  issues a sequence of bits out
of  	 according to a distribution that depends on whether a node is regular,
using  +"$"$

, or misbehaving,  +"$"$
	  
. Node   sees the
bits correctly with (correctObservation).
6.2 R Simulation 81
1. Place nodes in the grid.
2.  nodes, select $  #(",)#- 	./)! ( and according probability
distribution of output  +"$"$

.
3. repeat
a)  nodes output byte according to  +"$"$

.
b)  nodes  , observe neighbors  correctly with probability(correctObservation).
c)  nodes  ,  update 
 
using the Beta function.
4. until $ * +, + being the number of observations at each location.
5. Pick node, move until cycle completed. Repeat 1–3.
until end of simulation, then  nodes   and  evaluate 
 
and compare to the
$

.
Second-hand information. 1. Iterations of the algorithm above.
2. Before moving,  nodes   and  output 
 
.
3.  nodes   and  update 
 
by integrating local 
 
and 

, the exchange
parters’ 
 
.
Deltas only. Same as second-hand information, but use only the delta between the


received at the last encounter and the current 

.
Third-hand information. Nodes do not only exchange their respective first-hand
information, but their second-hand information. Third-hand information is not
independent but reinforcing beliefs by potentially mirroring them back to the
originator, hence we only show the scenario for comparison.
With lies. Contaminated second-hand information.
We use probability distributions  $,, #"$/

 (probability of telling the
truth as an honest node) and  $,, #"$/
 
 (probability of telling the truth
when a node is a liar). Independent of its status as a regular or misbehaving
type, nodes can be liars or honest.
1. Iterations of second-hand algorithm, but drawing from the probability dis-
tribution to tell a lie or the truth.
2. Compare 
 
with all witnesses , weight 

by 

,  being the number
of witnesses considered, and integrate with 
 
.
82 Performance Analysis
3. Include the contaminated information regardless.
Lies excluded. When comparing, only use

s according to the compatibility met-
ric, deviating less than  from 
 
, with  being the deviation threshold and 
 
the accumulated reputation of  as seen by node  .
6.2.5 Factors and Parameters
In Table 6.2 we list the factors varied throughout the simulation, Table 6.3 contains the
unchanged parameters.
Factor Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Number of nodes 25 49 100
 being a misbehaving node 0.1 0.5 0.9
 being a liar 0.1 0.5 0.9
Witnesses neighbors friends random set
Liar strategy reverse worsen improve
Mobility local local plus far random
Table 6.2: Factors and their Levels
Parameter Level
observations before movement 10
 +"$"$

 0.99
 +"$"$
	  
 0.99
 correctObservation 0.99
 $,, #"$/

 0.99
 $,, #"$/
 
 0.99
$, the threshold for detection 0.75
, the deviation threshold 0.5
Table 6.3: Fixed Parameters
6.2.6 Results
Figure 6.9 shows the mean detection time, i.e., the time in the simulation when the last
node detected a particular misbehaving node, vs. which fraction of the misbehaving
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Figure 6.9: Mean Detection Time of All Misbehaving Nodes by All 25 Nodes.
nodes were detected by all at that time, Figure 6.10 shows the maximum detection
time for all nodes. Figures 6.11 and 6.12 show examples of larger networks, also
varying the number of misbehaving nodes and the number of liars. These examples are
representative of the results obtained by the simulation. We chose to show individual
representative examples for this type of plot of detection fraction versus time instead
of mean outcomes over several runs, since the type of a node both concerning the
cooperation and the lying properties are drawn from probability distributions and not
explicitly specified, thus the portion of misbehaving nodes or liars varies. However,
for the mean of the mean detection time by all nodes and the maximum of the max
detection time by all nodes, we consider several simulation runs in Figure 6.13.
Using the full set of second-hand information or using only the difference between
already received second-hand information and the current second-hand information
consistently perform very similarly and very well. Exchanging the full set of obser-
vations when nodes encounter repeatedly considers information as new that has been
integrated already and thus can bias the belief, whereas keeping track of the last ex-
changed information, albeit only two parameters per reputation, can add up to a sig-
nificant storage requirement in large mobile networks.
Over the course of the simulation, it has emerged that using the ‘liars excluded’ Bayesian
scenario significantly improves on the performance of the mean detection time when
compared to the ‘first hand’ scenario, yet the performance gain is even higher in the
worst case, namely the maximum detection time, i.e., the maximum time it takes for a
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Figure 6.10: Max Detection Time of All Misbehaving Nodes by All 25 Nodes.
misbehaving node to be deemed ‘detected’ by all the nodes of the network.
Another observation is that, as one would expect, the detection improvement given by
the use of second-hand information even in the presence of liars, but given the attempt
to discard the false accusations by means of our Bayesian approach, in fact increases
with the network size. The larger the network, the higher the probability of receiving
information about nodes before actually encountering them as neighbors and being
able to observe their behavior.
When nodes not only exchange their own first-hand information but hand on dissem-
inated information of a deeper transitivity level, their own ratings once voiced can be
reflected to them at a later time, thus reinforcing their original rating. Although using
this ’third-hand’ or ’nth-hand’ information consistently outperforms all other strate-
gies, it is not a valid choice since these ratings are not independent.
For networks of 25 nodes, some effects of varying the level of the factor of the lying
strategy are shown in Figures 6.14, and 6.17.The mobility impact is shown in Figure
6.15, and the choice of witnesses is depicted in Figure 6.16.Except for the mobility
factor, none of the others had an impact on either the first-hand information or the
truthful second-hand information scenario.
The performance of the Bayesian approach of liar exclusion improves when the num-
ber of liars is small and approaches the performance of truthful second-hand informa-
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Figure 6.11: Max Detection Time of All Misbehaving Nodes by All 49 Nodes.
tion. In the presence of many liars, the performance degrades gradually but is still
better than relying only on first-hand information. In all the figures, the scenario ‘with
lies’, i.e., integrating contaminated second-hand information regardless, performs bet-
ter than relying on first-hand information only, yet the price for this speed-up in detec-
tion time is that innocent nodes are also being classified as ‘detected’ by many nodes
due to the effect of false accusations. This has consistently been avoided by the ‘liars
excluded’ scenarios throughout the entire simulation.
Figure 6.18 shows that only the ’reverse’ lying strategy led to effective false accusa-
tions, i.e. false accusations that lead to the classification of regular nodes as misbehav-
ing. The number of effective false accusations increased with a growing population of
liars. The impact of false accusations was largely reduced by the Bayesian approach
(Lies Excluded).
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Figure 6.12: Max Detection Time of All Misbehaving Nodes by All 100 Nodes.
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Figure 6.18: Effective False Accusations.
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Chapter
7
CONFIDANT with Static Trust
“An insincere and evil friend is more to be feared
than a wild beast; a wild beast may wound your
body, but an evil friend will wound your mind.”
Buddha
“True friends stab you in the front.”
Oscar Wilde
An alternative to the reputation system and trust management presented in Chapter 4
is to rely on established trust relationships between nodes. This way, ratings received
from trusted nodes can be considered fully and thus speed up the detection and reaction
time. Using static trust relies on the correctness of the trust relationships, i.e. that
trusted nodes do not send spurious ratings.
7.1 Description
As shown in Figure 7.1, each node monitors the behavior of its next hop-neighbors.
If a suspicious event is detected, the information is given to the reputation system.
If the event is significant for the node, it is checked whether the event has occurred
more often than a predefined threshold that is high enough to distinguish deliberate
misbehavior from simple coincidences such as collisions. What constitutes the sig-
nificance rating can be defined for different types of nodes according to their security
requirements. If that occurrence threshold is exceeded, the reputation system updates
the rating of the node that caused that event. If the rating turns out to be intolerable,
the information is relayed to the path manager, which proceeds to delete all routes
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ALARM
evaluating
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initial state
Monitor
not trusted
Figure 7.1: Trust architecture and finite state machine within each node.
containing the intolerable node from the path cache. The node continues to monitor
the neighborhood, and an ALARM message is sent as described in the following:
In order to convey warning information, an ALARM message is sent by the trust man-
ager component. This message contains the type of protocol violation, the number
of occurrences observed, whether the message was self-originated by the sender, the
address of the reporting node, the address of the observed node, and the destination
address (either the source of the route or the address of a friend that might be inter-
ested). In the present simulation implementation, the ALARM is sent to the source of
the concerned route.
When the monitor component of a node receives such an ALARM message, it passes
it on to the trust manager, where the source of the message is evaluated. If the source is
at least partially trusted, the table containing the ALARMs is updated. If there is suffi-
cient evidence that the node reported in the ALARM is misbehaving, the information
is sent to the reputation system where it is again evaluated for significance, number of
occurrences and accumulated reputation of the node. Sufficient evidence means that
either the source of the ALARM is fully trusted or that several partially trusted nodes
have reported the same and their respective assigned trust adds up to a value of one
entirely trusted node or more.
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7.2 The Trust Manager
In an ad-hoc environment, trust management has to be distributed and adaptive [13].
This component deals with incoming and outgoing ALARM messages.
ALARM messages are sent by the trust manager of a node to warn others of mis-
behaving nodes. Outgoing ALARMS are generated by the node itself after having
experienced, observed, or received a report of misbehavior. The recipients of these
ALARM messages are so-called friends, which are administered in a friends list. We
consider friends to be configured in a way similar to device imprinting as described by
Stajano and Anderson [114] on a user-to-user basis.
Incoming ALARMs originate from either outside friends or other nodes, so the source
of an ALARM has to be checked for trustworthiness before triggering a reaction, thus
there is a filtering of incoming ALARM messages according to the trust level of the
reporting node. A mechanism similar to the trust management in Pretty Good Privacy
(PGP) for key validation and certification is used here for mobile ad-hoc networks for
trust management for routing and forwarding. In PGP [134], several levels of trust
can be expressed, e.g. ‘unknown’, ‘none’, ‘marginal’, and ‘complete’. When PGP
calculates the validity of a public key, it examines the trust level of all the attached
certifying signatures. It computes a weighted score of validity. For example, two
marginally trusted signatures might be deemed credible as one completely trusted sig-
nature. The weighting scheme is adjustable so that it can require a different number
of marginally trusted signatures to judge a key as valid. We use the same principle
but for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient trusted evidence for the
misbehavior of a node.
The trust manager consists of the following components.
o An alarm table containing information about received alarms.
o A trust table managing trust levels for nodes to determine the trustworthiness of
an alarm.
o A friends list containing all friends a node potentially sends alarms to.
In order to avoid centralized rating, local rating lists and or black lists can be main-
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tained at each node and be exchanged with friends by either sending a message or
piggybacking it on packets. Different ways of rumor or gossip spreading and their
similar mechanisms to epidemics have been investigated by Demers et al. [42] that
can be adapted for information flow to friends. The nodes can include black sheep in
the route request to be avoided for routing, which also alarms nodes on the way. Nodes
can look up senders in black list before forwarding anything for them. The problem
of how to distinguish alleged from proved misbehaving nodes and thus how to avoid
wrong accusations can be lessened by timeout and subsequent recovery or revocation
lists of nodes that have behaved well for a specified period of time. Another problem is
scalability and how to avoid blown-up lists, which can also be addressed by timeouts.
7.3 Performance Evaluation
The simulation was performed in GloMoSim [129], the setup is the same as in Chapter
6.
7.3.1 Scenarios and Results
Figure 7.2 shows the mean number of packets dropped, varying the pause times and the
network size, i.e. the number of nodes, but keeping the fraction of misbehaving nodes
fixed at a third of the total population. At any time during the simulation 10 CBR-
connections are active. In the defenseless network, the number of packets intentionally
dropped is up to two orders of magnitude greater than in the network fortified by
CONFIDANT. The results are fairly constant with respect to mobility, only decreasing
slightly in the case of an almost static network at a pause time of 900 s. The fortified
network is a little more sensitive to mobility. This can be explained by the increased
probability of meeting a previously unknown misbehaving node when nodes move
around more.
When looking at the number of packets dropped from a network-size perspective, it
can be seen from Figure 7.3 that the difference in performance increases with the total
number of nodes in the network. The fortified network keeps the number of dropped
packets fairly constant irrespective of the network size, whereas the defenseless net-
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Figure 7.2: Mean number of packets dropped versus pause time.
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Figure 7.3: Mean number of packets dropped versus number of nodes, one third is
misbehaving.
work deteriorates significantly with increasing total number of nodes.
In Figure 7.4, the confidence intervals are shown for the mean ratio of number of
packets dropped to packets originated. The analyzed network consists of 50 nodes
and the number of applications was increased to 30 in order to observe the behavior
in a more heavily loaded network. DSR fortified with CONFIDANT extensions loses
only a small fraction of packets (always less than 3%) because of misbehaving nodes,
whereas regular, defenseless DSR faces a loss of a significant number (around 70%)
of the packets, all other parameters being equal. The defenseless network does not
benefit from a more static network, as opposed to the fortified network.
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Figure 7.4: Number of packets dropped per number of packets originated by 30 appli-
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Figure 7.5 shows how the CONFIDANT protocol copes with a varying percentage of
misbehaving nodes in the total network population. The pause time is set to 0 to stress
the CONFIDANT protocol with a very dynamic network, where it cannot use the ad-
vantage of improving with more stability which it showed in the previous figures. The
number of applications is equally deliberately set as high as 30 for increased load. It
can be seen that in a defenseless network, already a small percentage of misbehaving
nodes can wreak havoc. There is not much difference in the number of intentionally
dropped packets as the percentage of misbehaving nodes increases. This can be ex-
plained by the fact that it does not matter where on the path a packet is lost. The
network fortified with CONFIDANT is more sensitive to the percentage of misbehav-
ing nodes, however, it still keeps the number of deliberately dropped packets low even
in a very hostile environment as given by more than half the population misbehaving
- given that there are enough nodes to provide harmless alternate partial paths around
misbehaving nodes.
In comparing the ratio of packets sent and received in Figure 7.6, the performance of
the fortified network in which a third of the population misbehaving is very close to
that of a regular benign DSR network without misbehaving nodes. The reason that
the ratio is below 100 % even in a benign network is that losses are not only due to
misbehaving nodes dropping packets but also to link errors or because nodes have
moved away too quickly for the protocol to catch up.
The goodput versus the percentage of misbehaving nodes is depicted in Figure 7.7. The
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misbehaving nodes.
network is again highly mobile with a pause time of 0 s, which explains the goodput
of only about 80% even for a network containing no misbehaving nodes. The fortified
network keeps this performance up in the presence of up to 40% misbehaving nodes
and deteriorates only slightly in the presence of up to 60% misbehaving nodes. With
90% or more misbehaving nodes finally, the fortified network cannot improve the per-
formance anymore. The fact that even in a population of only misbehaving nodes there
is still a goodput of about 20% can be explained by a portion of the communication
happening between nodes that are within each others radio range.
Figure 7.8 shows the throughput of clients and servers according to the CBR applica-
tions used. Clients send at a constant bit rate of 2 Mbits, the servers respond according
to the packets they receive. The fortified version is not very close to the benign net-
work, but it can also take advantage of longer pause times, i.e., a less mobile network,
whereas the performance of the defenseless version remains unacceptable.
Figure 7.9 shows the ratio of ALARM messages in the total number of control mes-
sages transmitted. It is always lower than 3%, although factors chosen, namely ‘num-
ber of nodes’, ‘number of applications’ and ‘fraction of misbehaving nodes’, are at
their maximum according to Table 7.1, thus presenting the least favorable case in these
simulation boundaries. It is also an upper bound given the parameters and factors of
this simulation in that the threshold for sending an ALARM after having detected a for-
warding failure is set to 1, i.e., every deliberately dropped packet detected is reported
by an ALARM message.
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Figure 7.8: Mean client and server throughput in a network of 50 nodes with one third
misbehaving, 20 simulation runs.
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Figure 7.9: Mean overhead caused by the CONFIDANT protocol, 20 simulation runs
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7.3.2 Estimation of Factor Relevance
In order to find out which factors actually have an effect on the performance metrics
and to reduce the number of experiments, a # factorial design according to Jain [62]
was performed, with  (the number of factors) being set to 3 and 5, # (the number of
repetitions of the experiment) set to 10, resulting in 8 and 32 experiments or 80 and
320 simulation runs, respectively. Table 7.1 shows the factors and the two extreme
levels that were chosen for the experiments.
Factor Level 1 Level 2
Number of nodes 10 50
Protocol defenseless fortified
DSR CONFIDANT
Pause time 0 s 600 s
Percentage of 0.00% 33.33%
misbehaving nodes
Number of 10 30
applications
Table 7.1: Levels for factorial design
The choice for the number of nodes was made with the intention to show both a very
small network that still allows for multiple paths and reasonable network connectivity
given the area and a larger network to get insights on scalability. The pause times were
chosen to reflect a very mobile network as well as a very moderately mobile one given
that the duration of the simulation is 900 s. The extreme levels for the percentage
of misbehaving nodes in the network population are motivated by the desire to show
the behavior of a network with a very high but probably still manageable fraction
of misbehaving nodes. This should then be compared to a totally benign network
situation. The number of applications, i.e. ongoing CBR connections, were chosen
bearing in mind both the capacity of nodes as well as scalability.
Table 7.2 shows the variation due to three factors, with a constant setting of one third
of the network population being misbehaving nodes and 10 applications taking place
in the network. It shows that the protocol, whether defenseless or fortified, has the
greatest impact on the number of dropped packets in the presence of misbehaving
nodes, which confirms the intuitive expectation. What is more surprising, is to see
that the pause time alone, i.e., the dynamicity of the networks has very little influence
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relative to the other factors. With the exception of the combination of the protocol
(which caused the most variation by itself) and the pause time (which had the smallest
contribution to the variation by itself), all the combinations contribute significantly to
the variation, which should not be neglected in the analysis. Although the percentage
of misbehaving nodes has been kept at the constant of one third, the number of nodes
also contributed significantly to the variation and was present in all the combinations
that mattered.
Factor Metric:
dropped
packets
A (Number of nodes) 9.97 %
B (Protocol) 60.78 %
C (Pause time) 1.17 %
AB 9.39 %
AC 10.11 %
BC 0.73 %
ABC 7.85 %
T (Total) 100.00 %
Table 7.2: Variation due to three factors and their combinations, 10 applications, one
third misbehaving nodes
The results in absolute numbers of dropped packets are listed in Table 7.3. The exper-
iments are shown with their combination of factors used according to Table 7.2.
Combination dropped packets
A10BfC0 30.83
A10BdC0 551.67
A10BfC600 58.67
A10BdC600 1309.00
A50BfC0 118.83
A50BdC0 2836.00
A50BfC600 5.50
A50BdC600 1354.00
Table 7.3: Mean number of dropped packets for each experiment with ten runs
Table 7.4 shows the variations in the number of dropped packets due to five factors
and relevant combinations. The combinations of factors are not listed if their individ-
ual contribution to the variance turned out to be negligible. In these # experiments,
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the protocol state does not have as much influence on the variance as in the # ex-
periments. This can be explained by the fact that the number of packets dropped in a
fortified network in the presence of one third misbehaving nodes is only on the order of
tens or hundreds, whereas in a defenseless network thousands of packets are dropped.
The fortified network behaves almost as well as a benign network, thereby leveling the
difference. Again, the pause time only contributes an almost negligible share to the
variation relative to the other factors. As can be expected the number of misbehaving
nodes is responsible for a significant portion of the variation, when varied between
zero and one third. Prominent among other combinations, which also contribute, the
combination of the protocol and the number of misbehaving nodes causes quite a sig-
nificant portion of the variance.
Factor Metric:
dropped
packets
A (Number of nodes) 4.97%
B (Protocol) 15.17%
C (Pause time) 0.07%
D (Percentage of misbehaving) 17.68%
E (Number of Applications) 5.00%
AB 4.97%
AD 4.81%
BC 5%
BD 16.17%
CD 4.78%
ABD 4.81%
BCD 4.78%
Table 7.4: Variation due to five factors and relevant combinations
Chapter
8 Test-Bed Implementation
“What is wanted is not the will to believe, but the
will to find out, which is the exact opposite.”
Bertrand Russel
8.1 Introduction
We are interested in the attacks on routing and forwarding in mobile ad-hoc networks.
Specifically, we want to determine whether and how attacks can be mounted and de-
tected by observation in a real network environment.
Several reputation-based systems to deal with misbehavior in mobile ad-hoc networks
have been proposed, all relying on some component to detect misbehavior in the neigh-
borhood of a node. To the best of our knowledge, so far, the evaluation of detection
has been restricted to simulations and only to the misbehavior type of not forwarding
packets not destined to one self. Even for the detection of this simple attack, some
concerns have been raised [82] whether it is unambiguously feasible to classify it as
such.
Our approach is to build a test-bed that can be used to test attacks as well as whether
they can be detected, and thus study the practicality and feasibility of several reputation-
based misbehavior detection systems.
The main contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows.
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 We provide a systematic list of attacks on DSR and evaluate the effort and gain
for mounting them as well as whether and how they can be detected.
 We extend the notion of passive acknowledgment to enable the detection of at-
tacks.
 We built and present here a test-bed that enables researchers to assess the feasi-
bility and detectability of attacks.
 We implemented and tested several attacks and showed their detection.
 We compared the performance of DSR enhanced by our extended passive ac-
knowledgment detection mechanism to regular DSR. We found that it performs
at least as well as explicit acknowledgment, but mitigates the problem of dupli-
cates due to lost acknowledgments.
8.2 Related Work: Test-Beds and DSR
implementations
We evaluated several existing test-bed environments and implementations of DSR in
view of what they provide to enable the detection of misbehavior. The criteria were
that it had to be a real network, support promiscuous mode, support DSR, support
passive acknowledgment, preferably have logging and scripting facilities, and it had to
work on current off-the-shelf hardware such as available network cards.
Specifically, we considered APE [3], MobiEmu [131], the Monarch DSR implementa-
tion [79], Click [70] and the pecolab DSR implementation [100], and the piconet DSR
implementation [113].
In comparison to the alternatives, the APE testbed combined with the piconet imple-
mentation of DSR fulfilled the largest range of our requirements. We integrated them
and added capabilities as described in Section 8.3.
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8.3.1 Overview
Our test-bed consists of several components. Whenever possible, we used components
that are already publicly available and serve at least part of our purposes. We then
proceeded to integrate the components by means of utilities that we modified to provide
the functionalities we need and to glue the parts together.
The resulting architecture can be seen from Figure 8.1. We describe the use and inte-
gration of the main components in more detail in the subsequent sections and just list
them briefly in the following.
 A Linux kernel module implementation of DSR called piconet [113] for routing.
We modified by adding mechanisms to provide regular passive acknowledgment,
our enhanced PACK for detection, and several attacks.
 The APE testbed [3] for scripting and mobility, and to integrate our distribution
to be booted from CD.
 Netfilter [104] for capturing packets in promiscuous mode. We patched it so that
it could handle packets promiscuously received using a new hook.
 PCMCIA card drivers pcmcia-cs for Linux, which we patched to enable promis-
cuous mode.
The setup for our experiments consists of 3 Pentium II laptops, 233 MHz, Linux kernel
2.4.19, APE 0.4, Redhat 7.2, and 1 Pentium IV laptop, 2.20 GHz, Linux kernel 2.4.20,
Debian 3.0r1(woody). For all laptops we used Orinoco Classic Gold 802.11b cards,
11 Mb/s, driver pcmcia-cs-3.2.1 (orinoco 0.11b driver included).
8.3.2 Adding PACK to Piconet
The first problem to solve was to put the network interface in promiscuous mode. We
use an hack of the orinoco cs driver provided within the APE test-bed source files [3].
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Figure 8.1: Test-bed Architecture
Using this modified driver, we could put the ORINOCO Classic card in promiscuous
mode with the help of the iwtool command. We also try to use our implementation
using the monitor mode with the ORINOCO card, but it fails because of two problems:
we could not send any packets when the interface is in monitor mode and the captured
packets do not activate the NF_IP_PROMISCUOUS hook in our modified netfilter.
For more details on monitor mode, see [2] and [88].
When the interface is in promiscuous mode, it keeps all the packets it could overhear
on the network. But, netfilter drops the “promiscuous” packets before they could be
caught by any hook, so that it was impossible to process these packets within the netfil-
ter framework. Since keeping the same global architecture was the easiest solution, we
patched [127] netfilter to make it able to handle promiscuous traffic. This patch adds a
NF_IP_PROMISCUOUS hook that catches all packets promiscuously received. With
this improvement at hand, it was feasible to implement PACK over piconet.
We first add prom_handlerwhich is called whenever the NF_IP_PROMISCUOUS
catches a packet. After a check that ensures the originator belongs to the same subnet,
proc_pack_check is called. This function parses the packet in order to find if it has
a source route option, and in this case, retrieves the value of the segs left field. Then,
it looks for a packet that fulfills the tests for a packet to be a passive acknowledgment,
as described in the previous section (i.e. source address, destination address, etc. must
correspond). If it finds one, the packet is removed from the PACK queue. The packet
promiscuously received is then dropped since it was not destined to the node itself.
When a packet is forwarded or originated, there is a check to know whether the next
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hop is the destination. In this case, the explicit network-layer acknowledgment is used
with the function ack_q_add. Otherwise, we use the function pack_q_add instead
the previous one, taking care to change the size of the packet when building it since
it has no more ack request option in the header. pack_q_add is used when a node
sends a normal packet (dsr_send), a fragmented packet (dsr_fragment_send),
a route reply (send_rt_reply), a route error (send_rt_error) and when for-
warding a packet that includes a source route option (proc_sr_rt_opt).
The function pack_q_add first retrieves the segs left field from the header if it exists,
so that this value can easily be found later when parsing the queue looking for a PACK.
Then, it builds a clone of the packet that will be kept and sets a timer that expires after
PASSIVE ACK TIMEOUT ms. When this occurs, pack_timeout is called. This
function first checks if the maximum number of retransmissions is reached. If not, it re-
sends the packet. Else, it adds an ack request option in order to use network-layer acks
instead of PACK. To do that, the packet is first expanded using skb_copy_expand,
then we fill the ack request option and add this packet to the ack queue. The packet is
then processed as described in the initial implementation of piconet. The older packet
waiting in the queue to be PACKed is removed.
8.3.3 Netfilter
[1] [ROUTE] [3] [4]
[5][2]
[ROUTE]
Figure 8.2: Netfilter architecture
Netfilter [104] provides a set of hooks in various points in the IPV4 protocol stack as
shown in Figure 8.2. Packets enter on the left side of the diagram. They first pass
some sanity checks (i.e. not truncated, IP checksum correct) and then are passed to the
netfilter NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING [1] hook.
Next they enter the routing code, which decides whether the packet is destined for
another interface, or a local process.
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If the packet is destined for the machine itself, the netfilter framework is called again
for the NF_IP_LOCAL_IN [2] hook, before being passed to the process (if any).
If it is destined to pass to another interface instead, the netfilter framework is called for
the NF_IP_FORWARD [3] hook.
The packet then passes a final netfilter hook, the NF_IP_POST_ROUTING [4] hook,
before being put on the network again.
The NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT [5] hook is called for packets that are created locally.
Now, we can see when each hook is activated. Kernel modules can register to listen
to these hooks by using the nf_register_hook function. The module must define
the priority of function within the hook, so that each function listening to this hook
are called by order of priorities. When a function is called, it could then interact with
the packet and manipulate it. The module can then tell netfilter to do one of these five
things:
1. NF_ACCEPT: continue traversal as normal.
2. NF_DROP: drop the packet.
3. NF_STOLEN: we have taken over the packet; don’t continue traversal.
4. NF_QUEUE: queue the packet.
5. NF_REPEAT: call this hook again.
NF_ACCEPT is used whenever we need to let a packet continue its way as if the mod-
ule were not loaded: for example, if a node sends a packet that is addressed to a node
that is not on its subnet (e.g. on a wired LAN). We use NF_ACCEPT to let the packet
follow the standard kernel routing rules. When a node receives a packet that is destined
to itself, it processes it and removes the DSR header, then it uses NF_ACCEPT to let
the packet follow its way to the upper layers. NF_DROP is used quite often. for exam-
ple, when a node receives a bad packet, it simply discard it by returning this NF_DROP,
or, when it gets a packet promiscuously, it processes it and then releases it with
NF_DROP since this packet is not destined to itself. NF_STOLEN is only used one
time: when the kernel sends a packet, a node intercept it in the LOCAL_OUT HOOK
and modifies its routing if needed. At the end, it uses NF_STOLEN to tell the kernel
that it will send the packet itself and so, the kernel has nothing more to do with it.
NF_QUEUE and NF_REPEAT are never used in our implementation.
8.3 Test-Bed Design 109
8.3.4 Initial Piconet Implementation
8.3.4.1 Sending a packet
Piconet uses the netfilter framework to intercept the packets and manipulate them to
implement the DSR protocol. Referring back to Figure 8.2, piconet uses the PRE_ROUTE
[1] and the LOCAL_OUT [5] hooks. Additionally, the POST_ROUTE [4] hook is used
for the DSR to IP gateway. In the next subsections, we explain the internals of piconet
by following the journey of a packet through the whole implementation.
When we send a packet, this packet is intercepted by the LOCAL_OUT hook of our
module. The function local_out_handler is called. Some preliminary tests
check if the packet is destined to our subnet or if it is not a multicast for example.
Then, the function tries to build a route entry that can be add to the packet.
The route table is first parsed using lookup_route. If no route is found, then we
send a route request by using send_rt_req. First, this function interacts with the
route request cache (i.e. set the timer,...). Then, finish_send_rt_req is called.
Like all the other functions that output packets, that function first allocates some
memory to have enough place to build our packet. Then, it matches the IP header
struct and fills IP fields. Next, it adds a DSR header struct and fills the common
DSR header. Now, it is time to add the DSR options to the packet. In this case, we
only add a dsr_rt_req_opt, but if we send a normal data packet, we could add
a dsr_src_rt_opt or maybe a dsr_ack_req_opt if we want network-layer
acknowledgments. The important point is to be sure to allocate the right amount of
memory for the packet.
When the packet is built, there are two different possibilities. Maybe, we do not receive
a route reply for the moment and send_q_add is called to add the packet to the skb
queue and we set a timer, so that the request could stop after a timeout expires. If we
have already a route to send the packet, dsr_send is called.
This function adds the DSR header and builds the packet in the same way we did for
the route request above. In this implementation, an explicit network-layer ack was
used since it was the easiest solution. Therefore, we add an ack request option to every
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packet built in dsr_send. We also add the packet in an ack queue, that keeps a clone
of all the packets waiting to be acknowledged, by using ack_q_add.
This function builds a clone of the packet, sets a timer and adds the clone to a list.
If the timer expires, ack_timeout is called. That function manages the number of
timeouts and retries.
8.3.4.2 Receiving a packet
When a packet enters the stack, the PRE_ROUTE hook calls pre_route_handler.
It first checks if the packet implements the DSR protocol. Next, it parses the header in
order to find all the options. Each time an option is found (PAD1, PADN, ROUTE REQ,
ROUTE REPLY, ROUTE ERROR, ACK REQ, ACK, SRC ROUTE), a correspond-
ing function is called.
proc_rt_req_opt is called for a route request option. This function adds the
reverse route to the originator in the route cache and then determines if we are the
destination of the route request. If yes, it sends a route reply with send_rt_reply.
Else, it checks whether we are not already in the route to avoid loops and if it is the
first time we process this route request. In this case, the route request is rebroadcast
using rebcast_rt_req.
proc_rt_reply_opt is called for a route reply option. This function only adds
the route contained in the packet to the forward route cache.
proc_rt_error_opt is called for a route error option. It only removes the route
from the route cache using remove_route.
proc_ack_req_opt is called for an ack request option. It sends an ack reply.
proc_ack_reply_opt is called for an ack reply option. This function first adds
the neighbor address to the forward route to speed up the route discovery. Then, it
finds and remove the packets from the ack queue.
Finally, proc_src_rt_opt is called when a source route option is found. It begins
with some checks to determine if we are the destination of the packet or the gateway.
In this case, no more processing is done. Else, it decreases the segs left field and adds
route to source and to destination to the forward and reverse route table. After the
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forward address is determined, it is time to route the packet correctly. It bypasses the
kernel routing with ip_route_input, otherwise the kernel will send it directly to
the destination address of the IP header since this node is on the same subnet.
When all the options are processed, the function pre_route_handler removes the
DSR header from the packet if the packet is destined to us and passes it to the upper
layer (through LOCAL IN).
8.3.5 Our Use of the APE Test-Bed
The APE Test-Bed provides some facilities to lead real world multi-hop wireless tests:
 Deployment of the tests is facilitated by the possibility to use a bootable CD-
ROM or a package on a Linux or Windows machine.
 Scripted scenarios enable people to physically carry out the experiments without
prior instruction. Instructions are displayed on the laptops so that the tests could
be easily reproducible.
 Possibility to add more routing protocols using scripts that initialize and cleanup
sessions.
 Centralization of logs is done in a Master/Slaves architecture. This simplifies
the post-analysis of the logs (e.g. synchronization).
 Visualization of node placements and movements can be done using a Java in-
terface. This tool uses the radio signal strength (superspy) to build the map of
nodes.
 Analysis tools are also provided to retrieve some basics metrics like virtual
movement, data loss rate or path optimality.
 Mobility can be emulated by the mackill function which blocks out MAC ad-
dresses.
 It is extensible and based on a Linux environment.
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More details can be found in [93].
We were able to build a personalized APE distribution quite easily to add the func-
tionalities we require. First, we need to combine the sources of APE, a new kernel
(2.4.19 in our case), and the sources of PCMCIA-CS (3.2.1 in our case). Then, we
apply a patch for the kernel, so that it is able to use the mackill module which we use
to disable the communication between two nodes at the MAC layer. This way, we can
also emulate a loss of connection without having to move the nodes. Then, we apply a
patch for the pcmcia-cs package that adds the so-called superspy and the promiscuous
mode to the orinoco driver, as a prerequisite for the PACK function.
A routing protocol has to be implemented as a kernel module in order to be integrated
in the APE test-bed, we do this with the piconet DSR module. Then, we define a
script used to initiate and cleanup the module. This architecture makes APE very
extensible and modular. We also add some new scenarios and modify the configuration
file to match our requirements. Finally, after compiling the whole package (kernel and
pcmcia-cs and our own modifications included), we make a bootable CD-ROM and a
zip package.
If we use the zip package, the installation is very simple. We just need to extract it in
the root directory /, and there is a script file that must be run to modify our bootloader.
More details can be found in [4].
After installing APE and booting with this distribution, we start experiments by using
the command start_test. It opens a menu in which we choose the scenario, the
node representing the machine, and the protocol we want to use. When the experiments
are completed, data gathering is done using a script.
8.4 Attacks Implemented in the Test-Bed
8.4.1 Choice
After testing the PACK implementation we added to piconet, we focused our attention
on attacks that could be detected by adding more watchdog capabilities in our imple-
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mentation. We kept three types of attacks: header modification, partial dropping, and
sending forged route error messages.
8.4.2 Header modification
8.4.2.1 Selfish attacks
First, we modify the PACK piconet in order to implement some selfish attacks that will
help the attacker saving power. We keep three different modifications.
1. Last Hop External: We change this flag in the route reply option to make this
route less interesting for the initiator of the route discovery. If it receives more
than one route, it must prefer the ones that have this flag set to zero. This is done
just by changing the value of rtreply->lasthopx in the proc_rt_reply_opt
function if we are not the destination of the packet. We do the same for the Last
Hop External and First Hop External fields in the source route option.
2. Removing itself from the route reply option: If a node removes its own address
from the route reply option, it will not take part of the route and save power. To
implement this, we add some code in the proc_rt_reply_opt function that
looks for the address of the node itself, removes it and appends the addresses
following it. It changes the blank line at the end of the route reply option to a
PADN option.
3. Route error modification: If a node finds a route error option in the header,
it modifies it in a selfish way. It changes the error source address to the ad-
dress of the next-hop and the address of the unreachable node to its own, so
that the next hops will remove it from their route cache. We add this attack in
proc_rt_err_opt since it will modify a packet that includes a mandatory
source route option.
We investigate how these modifications work in a real environment:
1. Last Hop External: Since piconet does not deal with this flag when determining
the best route, this attack has no effect on the routing.
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2. Removing oneself from the route reply option: This attack works in our simple
test environment. Every time the source receives the modified route reply, the
data packet it sends does not reach its destination because of the false route. If
another route to the destination exists, then the route is changed to avoid the
attacker.
3. Route error modification. The modification works and the receiver has to delete
the route, thus avoiding the attacker.
8.4.2.2 Malicious attacks
Then, we add some others attacks that can be mounted by altering the header. These
attacks will not help the attacker saving power, but only disrupting routes. We test the
following:
1. Source route option altering: a node changes its address in the source route
option so that the next hops will add an incorrect route in its route cache. This
attack is implemented in the proc_src_rt_opt function.
2. Error destination address altering: A node changes the Error Destination Ad-
dress in the route error option to discard route errors. When the destination of
the route error will receive the packet, it will not be processed and the route will
not be deleted.
How these modifications work in a real environment:
1. Source route option altering: This attacks works in our simple test environment.
The answer of the destination of the modified packet never arrives. So that, this
node must initiate a new route discovery process since he has no other route to
destination.
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8.4.3 Partial Dropping
This attack consists of dropping an arbitrary packet at a constant rate. The attacker
will drop this packet whenever it is resent. To implement this attack, we add a new
drop_q that keeps a log of the packet we drop. Whenever a packet is caught by the
NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING hook, we first check if this packet has already been dropped
using the check_drop function. In this case, we drop it again. Then, the packet
enters the drop_packet function that checks if the packet must be dropped or not.
In this case, we add the packet in the drop_q queue so that we could identify it later
when it is resent.
This attack works well in our tests. We use a rate of one drop every ten packets. The
previous hop detects the drop when the PACK timeout expires. It resends the packet
that will be dropped again by the attacker and emits a route error after the explicit ACK
timeout. Without link-layer acknowledgments, we have no reliable way to detect if the
packet was lost because the next hop went out of range or dropped it intentionally. A
heuristic, however, is that if subsequently a packet originating from the next hop is
overheard, the node is in the range.
8.4.4 Fabrication of Forged Route Errors
An attacker could forge ROUTE ERROR packets causing nodes to incorrectly remove
optimal routes from their Route cache. In the worst case, this attack could prevent a
node from being able to route any packets. In our test implementation, we just emit a
forged route error whenever the identification value in the IP header is a multiple of 3
and the packet includes a source route option.
The attack works well in our environment. The source of the packet removes this
route from its route cache and starts a new route discovery process. This attack can be
detected when the next hop overhears the forged ROUTE ERROR that corresponds to
a packet it just received. If the attacker does not forward the packet, it will be detected
by the previous hop using passive acknowledgment.
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8.5 Discussion
Contrary to concerns raised against the watchdog to correctly detect packet dropping
[82], the attacks we implemented were indeed detected successfully by use of our
enhanced passive acknowledgment. The concerns were that for instance the partial
dropping attack could lead to false conclusions in the case of ambiguous or receiver
collisions. In all of our experiments, even with very high traffic load, we never experi-
enced a single collision. Another potential objection to the effectiveness of a watchdog
for the detection of dropping is that nodes could use power ranges just large enough
to reach the previous hop but not the intended next hop if it is further away. This is
very difficult to achieve, the power range adaptation in current off-the-shelf cards is
not very precise, additionally nodes would constantly have to find out their distance to
their neighbors that are potentially mobile.
Since we rely only on acknowledgments, passive or explicit, to send error messages
and we currently have no link-layer notification in case a link breaks, a node mov-
ing out of range cannot be distinguished from a node that drops packets instead of
forwarding them. This has to be taken into account when fixing thresholds for misbe-
havior detection.
The implemented attacks and their detection worked in all the experiments, therefore it
would make little sense to show graphs on that. What is more illustrative is the perfor-
mance of the network with our enhanced passive acknowledgment in place and com-
pare it to the regular implementation with explicit acknowledgment, to see whether
it has an impact on throughput, loss, and delay. The enhanced passive acknowledg-
ment takes more computation due to the effort of overhearing, comparing and added
checks for modification. On the positive side, however, passive acknowledgment does
not need to send extra packets for acknowledgment and thus reduces the traffic. As
exemplified by Figure 8.3 showing small packet size and 8.4 with large packet size,
we found that the network performance was as least as good as when using regular
explicit acknowledgment, sometimes even better. Even at very high traffic load, the
computational overhead did not have any detrimental influence, and using passive ac-
knowledgment mitigates the problem of duplicates that arise due retransmissions of
packets that successfully arrived but the acknowledgments were lost.
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In the experiment shown, we had the laptops topology aligned in a row to enforce
multi-hop forwarding. We varied the packet size, the number of pings, and the preload,
i.e. how many packets are sent in a first burst. The figures show an average over ten
runs, the standard deviation was very small in all cases, the bars are absent when no
loss occurred. We compared the original piconet implementation which uses explicit
acknowledgments without retransmission, to versions modified by us, namely explicit
acknowledgments with retransmission, and passive acknowledgment. Note that the
loss rates might depend on the idiosyncrasies of the machines and drivers used, so we
do not claim generality of these results. In the same vain, we observed that both the
round-trip time of pings and the total time taken for batches of pings are reduced using
passive acknowledgment, we are currently investigating the reasons for this, such as
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the role of the time it takes to send explicit acknowledgments and premature rerouting
attempts in the case of no retransmissions.
In our experiments we set the timer for the passive acknowledgment to 100 ms. The
timer is set when sending a packet and expires only if the packet has not been overheard
being sent by the next-hop node. We found in all our experiments that the actual time
to overhear was below 10 ms, even in the case of high traffic load. We therefore deem
the expiry time of 100 ms more than sufficient, it can even be reduced if necessary.
We have implemented both attacks and their detection. In order to render misbehaved
nodes harmless, this detection has to be followed by a response, the most effective
being isolation. Our test-bed can be extended by mechanisms to disseminate the de-
tection information gained by use of our enhanced passive acknowledgment. This
information can then serve as an input to a reputation system to serve as a basis for
decision making on a suitable response. The response itself can then also be added to
our test-bed to evaluate its effectiveness in a real environment.
Although we intend to use the test-bed to implement our own reputation system based
mechanism, we envision its use also for the community to evaluate different protocols.
We are in the process of making our code and detailed methodology public, so that the
test-bed can be used to investigate both potential attacks and countermeasures.
Chapter
9
Applying CONFIDANT to Other
Protocols
“Just as most issues are seldom black or white, so are most good solu-
tions seldom black or white. Beware of the solution that requires one
side to be totally the loser and the other side to be totally the winner.
The reason there are two sides to begin with usually is because neither
side has all the facts. Therefore, when the wise mediator effects a com-
promise, he is not acting from political motivation. Rather, he is acting
from a deep sense of respect for the whole truth.”
Stephen R. Schwambach
9.1 Secure Routing: Ariadne
As an example of secure routing by cryptography, we investigate the application of
CONFIDANT to Ariadne [56]. The first question we ask is whether a detection and
isolation mechanism such as CONFIDANT is still needed when a secure routing pro-
tocol is in place. To address this, we examine attacks on routing and forwarding and
determine whether they are thwarted by secure routing, CONFIDANT, or a combina-
tion of both.
Ariadne relies only on highly efficient symmetric cryptography. Ariadne can authenti-
cate routing messages using one of three schemes: shared secrets between each pair of
nodes, shared secrets between communicating nodes combined with broadcast authen-
tication, or digital signatures. In their paper, they mainly discuss the use of Ariadne
with TESLA [99], a broadcast authentication scheme that requires loose time synchro-
nization. Ariadne Route Discovery consists of a mechanism that enables the target to
verify the authenticity of the ROUTE REQUEST and per-hop hashing to verify that no
node is missing from the node list in the REQUEST. To convince the target of the le-
gitimacy of each field in a ROUTE REQUEST, the initiator includes a MAC computed
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with the shared secret key over unique data, for example a timestamp. The target can
verify the authenticity and freshness of the route request using the key shared with the
initiator. In a Route Discovery, the initiator wants to authenticate each individual node
in the node list of the ROUTE REPLY. A secondary requirement is that the target can
authenticate each node in the node list of the ROUTE REQUEST, so that it will re-
turn a ROUTE REPLY only along paths that contain only legitimate nodes. Each hop
authenticates new information in the REQUEST. The target buffers the REPLY until
intermediate nodes can release the corresponding TESLA keys. The TESLA security
condition is verified at the target, and the target includes a MAC in the REPLY to cer-
tify that the security condition was met. The protocol is vulnerable to an attacker on
the discovered route. To consider whether intermediate nodes are in fact forwarding
packets that they have been requested to forward, the authors propose to choose routes
based on their prior performance in packet delivery, relying on feedback about which
packets were successfully delivered. Ariadne cannot make use of some optimizations
of DSR, such as gratuitous route replies or packet salvaging, due to its restrictions on
the route discovery.
Secure routing protocols such as Ariadne or SRP [103] focus on the authenticity and
integrity of routing messages. Confidentiality is not considered to be an important
issue for the route header fields are not encrypted, hashes are only added to the header.
This enables CONFIDANT to operate as in combination with plain DSR, detecting
misbehavior based on observation.
In the following, we list a few examples of types of misbehavior that Ariadne does not
prevent, but CONFIDANT can detect and respond to.
Modifying the route header when forwarding. Ariadne guarantees that all nodes
on a route are authenticated in the route discovery process. However, when
nodes actually forward packets on such a route, they can change the route header
without restriction and change the actual route. There is no enforcement that the
secure route remains intact once used. CONFIDANT detects tampering with
the header information, unless there is a collusion of nodes in sequence on the
source route.
Lengthening the route. A misbehaving node receiving a REQUEST can try to add
nodes in the node list of the route in order to make the route going through him
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less attractive.
In Ariadne, if the keys of the added nodes are known by the attacker, then the
destination will check the MACs and the HASH of the packet, but it will not be
able to detect that the compromised nodes have been added to the route. Ariadne
is not robust to this attack when there are compromised nodes. CONFIDANT
detects illegitimate modifications of the header, unless there is a collusion of
nodes in sequence on the same source route.
Dropping packet, No forwarding. A misbehaving node can decide to drop some
or all the packets it has to forward. Ariadne does not deal with packet dropping.
CONFIDANT detects dropping by enhanced passive acknowledgment, again,
unless there is a collusion of nodes in sequence on the same source route.
9.2 Link-Layer Encryption: WEP
Although the link-layer encryption proposed for IEEE 802.11, Wired-Equivalent Pri-
vacy (WEP) [94], has been found to be not secure enough [14], enhanced WEP and
other methods for link-layer encryption have been proposed to secure wireless links.
Whether link-layer encryption is suitable for mobile ad-hoc networks is doubted, but
not entirely excluded.
Irrespective of the exact method used to encrypt link-layer information, if it is used,
it restricts the observability of packets and as such the capability of CONFIDANT to
successfully detect misbehavior by observation and enhance passive acknowledgment.
Only the MAC header would clear to read, the routing header would be encrypted.
CONFIDANT can still be useful, even with observation of the neighborhood being
severely restricted, by making inferences from the outcome of end-to-end communi-
cations. Since all nodes on the route are known to the source in DSR, CONFIDANT
can still build reputation records of nodes. When there is no positive feedback from
the destination that packets have arrived, CONFIDANT node   can update its 
 
and

 
for all nodes  on the route to the destination. Although also nodes that behaved
in a normal way can get their reputation deteriorated, it will still be better than the
reputation of a truly misbehaving node. The reason for this is that misbehaving nodes
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are by definition on dysfunctional routes every time they misbehave, whereas normal
nodes also show up on normal routes. In order not to increase false positives and pun-
ishing normal nodes, when link-layer encryption is used, the threshold of misbehavior
tolerance has to be increased. This, along with the fact that only end-to-end informa-
tion can be used as first-hand information, slows down the detection of misbehaving
nodes. When used with link-layer encryption, CONFIDANT is less efficient, yet over
time still effective.
Chapter
10
Conclusions
“Finally, in conclusion, let me say just this.”
Peter Sellers
10.1 Conclusions
We presented and evaluated a Bayesian approach for reputation representation, inte-
grating disseminated information, and coping with false accusations. We found that,
enabled by our Bayesian approach, by excluding ratings that deviate substantially from
first-hand information and the majority rating of second-hand ratings gathered over
time, robustness of the reputation system against false accusations is largely achieved.
This holds true even with a large number of misbehaving nodes and liars in the net-
work. As opposed to relying exclusively on first-hand information, the increased ro-
bustness of our approach does not have to be traded off against longer detection delays.
The detection speed improves significantly over merely using first-hand information
and, with a decreasing portion of liars, approximates the ideal case of using truthful
second-hand information.
In Chapter 1, we posed several questions, we repeat them here and give our findings.
 How can we use second-hand information without rendering the reputation sys-
tem unreliable due to potentially spurious ratings? Our approach of weighting,
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deviation test, fading, and Bayesian estimation gives good results.
 Are there attacks on the reputation system itself? How would they work and how
can we thwart them? We discussed several types of publishing spurious ratings
by lying and showed that our approach is robust in cases with little collusion of
liars and can recover from massive collusion attacks.
 What is the effect of mobility on the detection of misbehavior? The less mobile
a network, the bigger the benefit of second-hand information.
 With whom should nodes exchange information about other nodes? To keep
overhead low, local one-hop broadcast publications of ratings are efficient in
mobile settings. When the network is less mobile, it is beneficial for nodes to
exchange information with a few nodes that are more remote.
 What kind of information should be kept and exchanged? We found it beneficial
to keep both positive and negative information about observed node behavior,
since it enables us to get the performance of a node relative to its activity. Only
first-hand information should be exchanged for two reasons. First, publishing
second-hand information leads to gossip where a rating once published can be
repeated several times, it cannot be treated as independent, and it might be long
outdated. Second, by not publishing reputation and trust ratings, misbehaving
nodes cannot know what their rating is with other nodes and thus cannot mount
attacks exploiting it.
 Assuming a preventive scheme in place, is there still a need for a detection
scheme? Detection and isolation of misbehaving elements serve as a second
wall of defense and we showed that current secure routing protocols do not pre-
vent several attacks that CONFIDANT can detect and react to.
 How many misbehaving nodes can the network tolerate? We found that up to
half of the population can misbehave and CONFIDANT still can keep through-
put reasonably high for normal nodes.
 Even with detectable attacks, are there possibilities for an adaptive attacker to
go undetected? Only if the misbehavior is so infrequent as to fall below the
misbehavior tolerance threshold due to fading of the rating over time.
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 Which types of misbehavior can we detect? By use of our enhanced passive
acknowledgment CONFIDANT can detect dropping, modification, and some
types of fabrication of messages.
 We rely on two assumptions: behavior detectability and identity persistence.
What happens when we relax these assumptions? For behavior observability,
what happens when link-layer encryption such is employed? For identity persis-
tence, what happens when nodes change their identity, say, every few minutes?
Although less efficient in terms of detection speed, CONFIDANT can still func-
tion when the assumptions are relaxed.
10.2 Future Research
We have shown the details of CONFIDANT for mobile ad-hoc networks running DSR
and sketched its application to Ariadne and WEP. For future work, we would like to
investigate in depth the application of CONFIDANT to other protocols and domains.
The following is a list of further domains where CONFIDANT appears to be applica-
ble and potentially beneficial: other secure routing protocols such as SRP, other rout-
ing protocols for mobile ad-hoc networks such as AODV, peer-to-peer file-sharing,
anonymity systems, or distributed auctioning.
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